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STUDENT NOTES
RACE IPSA& VOTE DILUTION, RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING, AND THE PRESUMPTION
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
STEPHEN WOLF*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is frequently asserted that race "matters,"' and all too fre-
quently it is demonstrated that racial discrimination continues to
persist. But in a society "dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal,"' the important issue is not the fact that
race sometimes matters but the question of how should race mat-
ter. How do we move toward a society where individuals are
"judged [not] by the color of their skin but by the content of
their character."' In our focus upon remedying the present
effects of past and present discrimination, we should not lose
* BA., 1976 University of Delaware; Ph.D. Candidate, University of
Dallas; J.D. Candidate, 1997 Notre Dame Law School; Thos. J. White Scholar
1995-97. I would like to thank Thomas Steinke for suggesting the title that
eventually became the organizing principle of this Note. I would also like to
thank Colleen Wolf of Wolf Prints, Inc. for producing the maps which appear
in the appendices to this Note. I would especially like to thank Profs. John
Robinson,Jay Tidmarsh, and William Kelley of the Notre Dame Law School for
their patient encouragement of this project and their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts of this Note. Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to my
father, S. Allen Wolf, who gave up the opportunity to attend law school in order
to support his young family. I hope that through my achievements in the legal
profession I can return some of the love and inspiration he has provided for
me.
1. See, e.g., CORNEL WESr, RAcE MA~rERs (1993).
2. ABRAHAM LINcoLN, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the
Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 THE COLLECTED WORS OF
ABRAHAM LINcoLN 22, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953-55).
3. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream Speech (Aug. 28, 1963),
quoted in DAVID J. GARRow, BEARING THE Caoss: MRmTIN LurrHFR KING, JR. AND
THE SOUTrHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 284 (1986).
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sight of the goal of a "color-blind" society-we must not set our
eyes on the wrong prize.4
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno5 held that
the deliberate creation of voting districts in which minority voters
formed a majority of the members of the district-so-called
"majority-minority districts" 6-needs to be subject to the strictest
judicial scrutiny. Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor argued that "appearances do matter" in
the creation of voting districts:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district indi-
viduals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise
widely separated by geographical and political boundaries,
and who may have little in common with one another but
the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resem-
blance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception
that members of the same racial group-regardless of their
age, education, economic status, or the community in
which they live-think alike, share the same political inter-
ests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We
have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible
racial stereotypes.... By perpetuating such notions, a
racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of
4. Dr. King's "I Have A Dream" Speech is curiously absent from The Eyes
on the Prize reader developed in conjunction with the fourteen-part PBS
television series of the same title. See TmE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS
READER (David Garrow et al. eds., 1991). The editors acknowledge that the
speech is perhaps King's most famous oration, and was the climax of the march
that represented the "new high-water mark in the struggle for Black freedom."
Id. at 409, 138. They chose instead to include the original text ofJohn Lewis'
speech which was later revised at the request of the NAACP and the National
Urban League to retain President Kennedy's support for new civil rights
legislation. Id. at 137-38.
5. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
6. Throughout this article I will use the term "race-conscious districting"
to refer to both "majority-minority" districts and "minority-influence" districts.
A "majority-minority" district is a district in which a particular racial or ethnic
minority group constitutes a majority of the voters of the district-usually 60-
65% of the voting age population. The purpose of creating a majority-minority
district is to design a "safe" district from which a minority representative will
usually be elected. A "minority-influence" district is a district in which a
particular racial or ethnic minority group constitutes a significant minority of
the voters (usually 30-50%), or several racial or ethnic groups constitute a
significant minority or even a majority of the voters. The purpose of creating a
minority-influence district is to design a district in which racial or ethnic
minority groups have a significant influence in the election of the district's
representative. Minority-influence districts are usually created when a
particular racial or ethnic group is not sufficiently numerous or geographically
compact to support the creation of a majority-minority district.
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racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is some-
times said to counteract.
The message that such districting sends to elected rep-
resentatives is equally pernicious. When a district obvi-
ously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common
interests of one racial group, elected officials are more
likely to believe that their primary obligation is to repre-
sent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to
our system of representative democracy.
7
With Shaw, the Court called into question three decades of vote
dilution jurisprudence which transformed the way we elect our
federal, state, and local officials, and culminated in the creation
of majority-minority districts.
This paper will explore the tension between the Supreme
Court's older vote dilution jurisprudence and its newer racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence. In Part II, I will. analyze the polit-
ical effects of race-conscious districting which has increased the
number of minority representatives in Congress and, ironically,
helped to increase the number of Republican representatives as
well. In Part III, I will discuss the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
illustrate the process of reasoning which the Court has used to
create a presumption that some voting practices are racially dis-
criminatory because they have produced racially disproportion-
ate results. In Part IV, I will analyze the Court's older vote
dilution jurisprudence. In Part V, I will analyze the Court's
newer racial gerrymanderingjurisprudence. Finally, in Part VI, I
will offer some conclusions about the tension between the
Court's vote dilution jurisprudence and racial gerrymandering
jurisprudence.
II. THE POLUTICAL EFFECTS OF RAcE-CONscIous DISTIUCTrNG
During the reapportionment of congressional districts fol-
lowing the 1990 decennial census, the Justice Department used
its power under the Voting Rights Acte to force states to create
seventeen new black and hispanic "majority-minority" congres-
sional districts.' States covered by the special provisions of the
Voting Rights Act must submit their congressional districting
7. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647-48 (citations omitted).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
9. Juliana Gruenwald, Court Ruling Fxpected To Spark More Suits, CONG. Q.
WILuY. REP., July 1, 1995, at 1947.
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plans to the Justice Department for preclearance." The Justice
Department refused to preclear state congressional districting
plans which did not maximize the concentration of minority vot-
ers into majority-minority districts.
Georgia's experience in attempting to gain preclearance for
its congressional districting plan typifies the Justice Department's
approach. Georgia's congressional delegation was increased
from ten to eleven representatives by the 1990 apportionment. 1
In September, 1991, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a
congressional districting plan which contained two black major-
ity-minority districts and one black minority-influence district.12
Under the previous apportionment only one of Georgia's ten
congressional districts was a black majority-minority district-'
The Attorney General refused to preclear the state's congres-
sional districting plan because it only created two black majority-
minority districts.' 4
The General Assembly enacted a second congressional dis-
tricting plan which also had two black majority-minority districts
and one black minority-influence district, but increased the per-
centage of the black voting age population in each district' 5
The Attorney General again refused to preclear the plan because
the General Assembly did not adopt a congressional districting
plan modeled after a "max-black" plan, drafted by the American
Civil Liberties Union for the General Assembly's Black Caucus,
which contained three black majority-minority districts.16 The
General Assembly reluctantly adopted a third congressional dis-
tricting plan which contained three black majority-minority dis-
tricts, including the Eleventh Congressional District which
brought together the black voters of Atlanta, Augusta, and
10. For a discussion of the special provisions of the Voting Rights Act, see
Sec. V.B. infta. Fourteen states are subject to the special provisions of the
Voting Rights Act: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Redistticting in the States, 1992 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
28-A.
11. Miller v. Georgia, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2484.
16. Id.
Savannah.' 7 (See Appendix E.) The Attorney General finally
precleared this plan.'
Some Republicans advocated the creation of majority-minor-
ity districts to deprive white urban Democrats of their predomi-
nantly black urban base and force them to run in more
predominantly white suburban districts where they would be vul-
nerable to Republican challengers. 19 Republicans also hoped to
win a number of the hispanic majority-minority districts. Minor-
ity interest groups supported the creation of majority-minority
districts to encourage minority participation in the electoral pro-
cess, and increase the number of minority representatives in
Congress.0 White incumbent Democrats did not publicly
oppose the creation of majority-minority districts for fear of
alienating black and hispanic voters, but privately they pressured
state legislators to design congressional districts to preserve their
minority constituency. I
As a result of the Justice Department's efforts, there were
thirty-two black and twenty hispanic majority-minority districts
for the 1992 congressional elections. 2 The expectations of
minority interest groups that supported the creation of majority-
minority districts were partially realized as twenty new minority
representatives were elected in 1992.23 The number of black rep-
17. Id. The district court noted that "[t]he populations of the Eleventh
[District] are centered around four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that
have absolutely nothing to do with each other, and stretch the district hundreds
of miles across rural counties and narrow swamp corridors." Johnson v. Miller,
864 F. Supp. 1354, 1389 (S.D. Ga. 1994). The cities of Atlanta, Augusta, and
Savannah, which comprised three of the four comers of the bizarrely-shaped
district, "were all majority black, all at the periphery of the district, and... all
tied to a sparsely populated rural core by even less populated land bridges." Id.
at 1367. The Eleventh District "covered 6,784.2 square miles, splitting eight
counties and five municipalities along the way." Id.
18. MiUer, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
19. Beth Donovan, Political Dance Played Ou Through Legal Wrangling,
CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP., Dec. 21, 1991, at 3690, 3693-94.
20. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism The Voting Rights Act and the
Theoy of Black Electoral Succeis, in The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental
Fairness in Representative Democracy 41-70 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1319-26 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
for the efforts of the incumbents to preserve their minority constituencies in
the Eighteenth, Twenty-Eighth, Twenty-Ninth, and Thirtieth Congressional
Districts of Texas. When three of these districts were challenged as racially
gerrymandered districts, the State of Texas argued unsuccessfully before the
Supreme Court that the bizarre shape of the districts could be explained by the
effort to protect incumbents. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1953-54 (1996).
22. Redrawn Minority Districts Face Chalenges, 1993 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 22-
A.
23. Gruenwald, supra note 9, at 1947.
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resentatives increased from twenty-six to thirty-nine, and the
number of hispanic representatives increased from twelve to
nineteen, for a total of fifty-eight minority representatives.24
Thirty-one of the thirty-two black majority districts elected black
representatives, and sixteen of the twenty hispanic majority-
minority districts elected hispanic representatives.25 The remain-
ing eight of the thirty-nine black representatives and three of the
nineteen hispanic representatives were elected from non-major-
ity-minority districts. Six states elected black representatives for
the first time since the turn of the century.26
Republican hopes and Democratic fears that the creation of
majority-minority districts would unseat Democratic incumbents
were initially frustrated. Only three Democratic incumbents
were defeated as the result of the new majority-minority districts,
and all but two of the twenty new black and hispanic representa-
tives were Democrats.27 Expectations that the creation of major-
ity-minority districts would increase minority voter participation
in the electoral process were unfulfilled. The voter turnout rate
in most majority-minority districts was the lowest of any district in
the particular state.28
24. Id.
25. Redrawn Minority Districts, supra note 22, at 22-A. The First District of
Pennsylvania (a black majority-minority district), and the Twentieth, Twenty-
Sixth, and Forty-Sixth Districts of California, and Twenty-Ninth District of Texas
(all hispanic majority-minority districts) elected white representatives.
26. Gruenwald, supra note 9, at 1947. The six states were Alabama,
Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, all of which are subject
to the special provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
27. GOP's Comeback Dreams Dissolve, 1992 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 25-A. The
Eighteenth and Twenty-First Districts of Florida elected hispanic Republican
representatives. Fection '92 Resudts, 1992 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 35-A, 37-A.
28. Phil Duncan, Minority Districts Fail To Enhance Turnout, CONG. Q.
WxLy. REP., Mar. 27, 1993, at 798. For example, the two new majority-minority
districts in Georgia had the lowest voter turnout of any district in the state. In
the Second District, approximately 158,000 votes were cast, and in the Eleventh
District approximately 164,000 votes were cast. (Figures are rounded to the
nearest thousand.) The average for the other nine districts was 212,000 votes
cast; the next lowest district had 180,000 votes cast. In the Sixth District which
elected Newt Gingrich, 275,000 votes were cast. Election '92 Results, supra note
27, at 37-A.
The majority-minority districts that would later be found unconstitutional
were also among the lowest voter turnout districts in their state. The First and
Twelfth Districts of North Carolina were the second and third lowest districts,
respectively, in the state. The Eighteenth, Twenty-Nine, and Thirtieth Districts
of Texas were the fifth, first, and eighth lowest districts, respectively,
accompanied by the other majority-minority districts of the state. The Third
District of Florida was the second lowest district of the state; the lowest was the
Twenty-Third District, a majority-minority won by impeached former federal
district court judge Alcee Hastings. The Fourth District of Illinois, the Third
197]RACE LPSA
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court held that voters could chal-
lenge the creation of majority-minority districts as racial gerry-
mandering under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Before the 1996 elections, seven majority-minor-
ity districts in four states were redrawn by federal district courts
or state legislatures in response to successful racial gerrymander-
ing litigation. 0 As a result of this litigation, the total number of
District of Virginia, and the Twelfth District of New York were the lowest
districts in their states. The Twelfth District was the second lowest district in the
nation with approximately 75,000 votes cast; the lowest district in the nation was
the Thirty-Third District of California with only 51,000 votes cast. Id. at 35-A to
43-A.
29. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). I discuss this case in more detail
in Sec. V.B.3 infra.
30. North Carolina's First and Twelfth Districts (see Appendix A) were
held to be constitutional by the district court in Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408
(E.D.N.C. 1994), but found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Shaw v.
Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). The districts were not redrawn for the 1996
elections.
Louisiana's Fourth District (smAppendix B) was found unconstitutional by
a district court in Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). The
state legislature enacted a revised congressional districting plan which
contained two majority-minority districts whose boundaries were more
consistent with traditional districting principles, and the Attorney General
precleared the plan. (See Appendix C.) The district court also found the state
legislature's revised plan unconstitutional and substituted its own plan for the
1994 elections. (See Appendix D.) Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D.
La. 1994). The Supreme Court reinstated the state legislature's revised plan for
the 1994 elections, Louisiana v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994), and later
determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the state
legislature's revised plan, U.S. v. Hays, 115 S. CL 2431 (1995). On remand, the
district court again found the state legislature's revised plan unconstitutional
and substituted its own plan for the 1996 elections. Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F.
Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996). The district court's plan, which contained only one
majority-minority district, was used during the 1996 elections. A motion to
appeal is currently pending before the Supreme Court. Louisiana Black
Legislative Caucus v. Hays, 117 S. Ct. 44 (1996).
Georgia's Eleventh District (seeAppendix E) was found unconstitutional by
a district court in Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994). The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding in Miller v.Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1995). The district court later found the Second District
unconstitutional. Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1995). The
district court initially deferred to the state legislature to devise a new
congressional districting plan, but when a special session was unable to devise a
new plan, the district court fashioned its own remedial plan. (See Appendix F.)
Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995). The district court's plan,
which contained only one majority-minority district, was used during the 1996
elections. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's plan in Abrams v.
Johnson, 1997 WL 331802 (U.S. Ga.).
Texas' Eighteenth, Twenty-Ninth, and Thirtieth Districts (see Appendices
G, H, and I) were found unconstitutional by a district court in Vera v. Richards,
1997]
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majority-minority districts was reduced from fifty-two to forty-five:
the number of black majority-minority districts was reduced from
thirty-two to twenty-six, and number of hispanic majority-minor-
ity districts was reduced from twenty to nineteen.
In the 1996 congressional elections, the number of black
representatives decreased from thirty-nine to thirty-seven, and
the number of hispanic representatives remained at nineteen,
for a total of fifty-six minority representatives.31 Twenty-five of
the twenty-six black majority districts elected black representa-
tives, and seventeen of the nineteen hispanic majority-minority
861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994). The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's finding in Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1995). When the state
legislature failed to enact a revised congressional districting plan, the district
court devised its own plan. Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
To implement its plan in time for the 1996 elections, the court voided the
primary election results in the thirteen districts affected by the plan, and caused
three run-off elections in surrounding districts when no candidate received a
majority of the vote in the November elections. Juliana Gruenwald, 'Specal'
Eletion Is Just That For Texas Democrats, CONG. Q. WKLy. REP., Dec. 14, 1996, at
3402.
Florida's Third District (see Appendix J) was found unconstitutional by a
district court in Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996). The
Third District was part of a congressional districting plan devised by another
three-judge panel of the district court for the 1992 elections when the state
legislature had failed to enact a plan. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076
(N.D. Fla. 1992). The state legislature enacted a revised congressional
districting plan which the district court ordered to be used for the 1996
elections. Johnson v. Mortham, 1996 WL 297280 (N.D. Fla.). Since the 1996
elections, racial gerrymandering litigation has brought majority-minority
districts in three more states into question. Illinois' Fourth District (see
Appendix K) was held to be constitutional by a district court in King v. State
Board of Elections, 1996 WL 130439 (N.D. i.), but the Supreme Court has
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case back to the district
court for reconsideration in light of Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera. King v.
Illinois Board of Elections, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996). See Juliana Gruenwald,
Supreme Court Orders Panel To Review Chicago Distict, CONG. Q. WLY. REP., Nov.
16, 1996, at 3286. Virginia's Third District was found to be unconstitutional by
a district court in Moon v. Meadows, 1997 WL 57432 (E.D. Va.). See Ronald D.
Elving, Viginia Unlikely To Appeal Ruling Against 3r4 CONG. Q. WxLy. REP., Feb.
15, 1997, at 446. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding in
Meadows v. Moon, 1997 WL 274775 (U.S. Va.). New York's Twelfth
Congressional District was also found to be unconstitutional by a district court
in Diaz v. Silver, 1997 WL 94175 (E.D.N.Y.). SeeJudges Throw Out New York 12th,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Mar. 1, 1997, at 553.
31. Minorities in Congress, CONG. Q. WxLy. REP., Jan. 4, 1997, at 28. The
table fails to reflect that in the Forty-Sixth District of California, Loretta
Sanchez, an hispanic Democrat, narrowly defeated Robert Dornan, the white
Republican incumbent. See Election Results, CONG. Q. WKLy. REP., Feb. 15, 1997,
at 447, 448.
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districts elected hispanic representatives.32 Twelve of the thirty-
seven black representatives and two of the nineteen hispanic rep-
resentatives were elected from non-majority-minority districts.
All of the incumbents from the majority-minority districts
redrawn as the result of racial gerrymandering litigation were re-
elected. The voter turnout rate in the majority-minority dis-
tricts continued to frustrate expectations s4
Republican hopes for regaining control of the Congress
were realized in 1994 (and sustained in 1996) as they won a
majority of Southern congressional seats for the first time since
Reconstruction.35 After the 1990 elections, Democrats held a
267-167 majority; but after the 1996 elections, Republicans main-
tained a 227-207 majority-a net gain for the Republicans of
sixty seats.3 6 The eight Southern states covered by the Voting
Rights Act provided 40% of that net gain.3 7 Republicans won
fifty-one of these eighty-two Southern seats in the 1996 election,
up from twenty-seven of the seventy-six Southern seats in the
1990 election.3
Georgia's experience illustrates this emerging Republican
trend. After the 1990 election, Newt Gingrich was the only
Republican representative andJohn Lewis was the only black rep-
resentative in Georgia's congressional delegation; the other eight
representatives were white Democrats. Today, there are eight
white Republican representatives, including House Speaker
Gingrich, and three black Democratic representatives.3 ' The
turnover in Georgia's Eighth District illustrates the political
effect which the creation of majority-minority districts may have.
32. The First District of Pennsylvania and the Twentieth and Twenty-Sixth
Districts of California elected white representatives.
33. Juliana Gruenwald, Incumbents Survive Redisicting, CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP., Nov. 9, 1996, at 3229. Cleo Fields, a black Democrat from the Fourth
District of Louisiana, retired when his district was redrawn, and Jim McCrery, a
white Republican, was elected. Craig Washington, a black Democrat from the
Eighteenth District of Texas, also retired and Sheila Jackson-Lee, another a
black Democrat, was elected. Gene Green, a white Democrat from the Twenty-
Nine District of Texas, was also re-elected.
34. Election Results, supra note 31, at 447-55.
35. Gruenwald, supra note 9, at 1947.
36. House Membership in the 102nd Congress, 1990 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 920-
21; Election Results, supra note 31, at 447-55; Special'Election Is Just That For Texas
Democrats, supra note 30, at 3402. The remaining member of the House,
Bernard Sanders, is an Independent elected from Vermont.
37. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia.
38. House Membership in the 102nd Congress, supra note 36, at 920; Electon
Results, supra note 31, at 447-55.
39. Gruenwald, supra note 9, at 1948.
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The creation of a black majority-minority district in the Eleventh
District reduced the black voting age population of the Eighth
District from 35% to 21%. 40 J. Roy Rowland, the white Demo-
cratic incumbent of the Eighth District received only 56% of the
vote in the 1992 election after receiving no less than 69% of the
vote in the previous elections.41 Rowland retired before the 1994
election, and Saxby Chambliss, a white Republican, won the seat
with 63% of the vote.42 Chambliss retained the seat in the 1996
election with 53% of the vote.4"
The narrow and partisan political effects of race-conscious
districting at the national level are mixed. The creation of
majority-minority districts has increased the number of minority
representatives in Congress, but it has also contributed to the
decline in the number of Democratic representatives in Con-
gress. It remains an open question whether minority political
interests are better served by concentrating minority voters into a
small number of majority-minority districts or by dispersing them
into a larger number of minority-influence districts. Further-
more, the creation of majority-minority districts has not
increased minority voter participation in the electoral process.
Majority-minority districts consistently have the lowest voter turn-
out rates of any districts in the nation.
The larger political effects of race-conscious districting are
more diffuse but also more troubling. As Justice O'Connor sug-
gested in her majority opinion in Shaw, 4 race-conscious district-
ing tends to reinforce racial stereotypes, exacerbate racial
divisions, and increase racial isolation. More than that, race-con-
scious districting is a palpable reminder that we continue to
endorse the principle that "race matters." Before I examine the
Supreme Court's vote dilution jurisprudence which has led to
the adoption of race-conscious districting, and later the Supreme
Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence which has led to
the questioning of race-conscious districting, I will first examine
the procedural devices which have led to the presumption that
some voting practices are racially discriminatory because they
produce racially disproportionate results.
40. Id. at 1947.
41. Id. at 1947-48.
42. Id. at 1948.
43. Election Rsults, supra note 31, at 449.
44. See text at fn. 7 supra.
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III. TIE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Procedural devices analogous to those found in the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur have been developed by the Congress and the
Supreme Court in the voting rights context, and have created the
presumption that some voting practices are racially discrimina-
tory because they produce racially disproportionate voting
results.' These procedural devices have led to the transforma-
tion of the way states and localities elect their legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial officials, and are largely responsible for the
creation of majority-minority districts. For that reason, some
explanation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is in order here.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur developed from a nine-
teenth century English tort case in which a barrel of flour rolled
out of a warehouse and injured a pedestrian. The victim was
unable to provide evidence that the warehouser was negligent in
handling the barrel, and the question arose whether negligence
could be presumed from the mere fact that the barrel had struck
him. Baron Pollock of the Court of Exchequer argued that negli-
gence could be presumed in such circumstances:
[T] here are many accidents from which no presumption of
negligence can arise, but I think it would be wrong to lay
down as a rule that in no case can presumption of negli-
gence arise from the fact of an accident. Suppose in this
case the barrel had rolled out of the warehouse and fallen
on the plaintiff, how could he possibly ascertain from what
cause it occurred? It is the duty of persons who keep bar-
rels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out,
and I think that such a case would, beyond all doubt,
afford prima facia evidence of negligence. A barrel could
not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence, and
to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses
45. Similar procedural devices have been developed to infer or presume
racially discriminatory employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Texas
Dep't of Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (disparate treatment cases); International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (pattern and
practice cases); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (disparate impact
cases); and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed motive
cases). See also Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatoty Intent Under Title VII:
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. Rzv. 1201
(1982).
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from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to me pre-
posterous.... The present case upon the evidence comes
to this, a man is passing in front of the premises of a dealer
in flour, and there falls down upon him a barrel of flour. I
think it apparent that the barrel was in the custody of the
defendant who occupied the premises, and who is respon-
sible for the acts of his servants who had control of it; and
in my opinion the fact of it falling is prima facia evidence
of negligence, and the plaintiff who was injured by it is not
bound to show that it could not fall without negligence,
but if there are facts inconsistent with negligence it is for
the defendant to prove them.'
Normally the victim would have had to prove that the ware-
houser had not handled the barrel with reasonable care, but in
this case the need for such individual proof was diminished so
the victim would be compensated for his injury. It was inferred
that the warehouser had not handled the barrel with reasonable
care because: (1) the warehouser had control over the barrel; (2)
barrels do not roll out of warehouses without negligence; and (3)
the warehouser was in a better position than the victim to pro-
vide evidence concerning the handling of the barrel. These
assumptions provided sufficient ground to infer that the ware-
houser was negligent, and to shift to the warehouser the burden
of producing evidence that he was not negligent.
Dean Prosser explains the significance of this argument, and
the development of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:
The Latin phrase, which means nothing more than "the
thing speaks for itself," is the offspring of a casual word of
Baron Pollock during argument with counsel in a case in
1863 in which a barrel of flour rolled out of a warehouse
and fell upon a passing pedestrian. In its inception the
principle was nothing more than a reasonable conclusion,
from the circumstances of an unusual accident, that it was
probably the defendant's fault. It soon became involved,
however, in cases of injuries to passengers at the hands of
carriers, with the aftermath of an older decision which had
held that the carrier had the burden of proving that it had
not been negligent. The two principles, one concerned
with the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the other
with the burden of proof, gradually became confused and
intermingled; and from this fusion there developed an
46. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Exch. 1863).
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uncertain "doctrine" of res ipsa loquitur, which has been
the source of some considerable trouble to the courtS.
4 7
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned with the suffi-
ciency of circumstantial evidence and with the allocation of the
burden of proof. Several different procedural devices have been
employed to permit a plaintiff to prove negligence from circurn-
stantial evidence: the permissive inference, the rebuttable pre-
sumption, the shift of the burden of production to the
defendant, and the shift of the burden of persuasion to the
defendant. These devices may be illustrated by using the case of
the pedestrian injured by the barrel that rolled out of the
warehouse:
1. A permissive inference without a shift in the burden of
production or persuasion. The injured pedestrian offers cir-
cumstantial evidence that the barrel that struck him rolled
out of the warehouser's building. The inference to be
drawn from this evidence is left to the factfinder who may
or may not conclude that the warehouser was negligent.
At all times the burden of producing evidence and proving
negligence rests with the injured pedestrian.
2. A rebuttable presumption with a shift in the burden of
production. The injured pedestrian offers circumstantial
evidence that the barrel that struck him rolled out of the
warehouser's building. This evidence creates the legal pre-
sumption' that the warehouser was negligent. This pre-
47. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 39, at 243-44 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TmE LAW OF
TORTS). The most frequently quoted statement of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is that of Chief Justice Earle: "There must be reasonable evidence of
negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants, and the accident is such that as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care." Id. § 39, at 244
(quoting Scott v. The London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665,
667 (1865)). In America, the conditions usually stated as necessary for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are as follows: "(1) the event
must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Id.
48. Dean Prosser explains legal presumptions as follows:
The party having the burden of proof may be aided by the
procedural devices known as presumptions. A presumption has been
defined as "an assumption of the existence of one fact which the law
requires the trier of fact to make on account of the existence of
another fact or group of facts, standing alone." It is, in other words, a
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sumption shifts to the warehouser the burden of
producing evidence that he was not negligent. If the ware-
houser produces evidence that he was not negligent, the
presumption is rebutted. The burden of proving negli-
gence remains with the injured pedestrian, and with the
rebuttal of the presumption, there is disputed evidence
concerning the warehouser's negligence.4 9 The factfinder
may or may not conclude that the warehouser was
negligent.
3. A rebuttable presumption with a shift in the burden of
persuasion. The injured pedestrian offers circumstantial
evidence that the barrel that struck him rolled out of the
warehouser's building. This evidence creates the legal pre-
sumption that the warehouser was negligent. This pre-
sumption shifts to the warehouser the burden of
producing evidence and proving that he was not negligent.
rule of law for the determination of a question of fact, in the absence of
suffcient evidence to prove the fact itsey The classic illustration of a
presumption is the rule which calls for the conclusion that a person is
dead when it is shown that the person has disappeared for seven years
without explanation.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TmE LAW OF ToRTs, supra note 47, § 38, at 240 (empha-
sis added).
49. For the sake of clarity I have oversimplified the effect of the rebuttal
of the presumption. Dean Prosser explains that there are two types of
rebuttable presumptions:
[Most] presumptions are created for the purpose of giving effect, as a
settled rule, to the normal inference or conclusion which most people would
draw, if permitted from a given set of facts, in the absence of satisfactoy
definite evidence as to the conclusion itse~f ... [Such presumptions] place
upon the adverse party the "burden" of going forward and offering
further evidence .... but they do not affect the ultimate burden of
proof... once all the evidence is in. When persuasive evidence to the
contrary is introduced, the occasion for the presumptions, as rules of
law, is gone, and they simply cease to exist .... All that remains is
whatever inference from ordinary experience is to be drawn from the
facts, which has whatever probative value the facts may justify.
There are, however, other presumptions which obviously are
imposed in part as a matter of policy, to compel persons in a position
of special responsibility to disclose evidence within their control,
under a penalty of a procedural disadvantage in the case they do not.
They are, in other words, "smoking out" presumptions, designed to bring
about a result rather than to give effect to probabilities.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, supra note 47, § 38, at 240-41
(emphasis added). Because the first type of rebuttable presumption is similar
in effect to a permissive inference, I will consider it to be part of the permissive
inference device throughout this article, and will reserve the rebuttable pre-
sumption (with a shift in the burden of production) device for the second type
of rebuttable presumption described by Prosser.
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If the warehouser produces evidence that he was not negli-
gent, there is disputed evidence concerning the ware-
houser's negligence. The factfinder may or may not
conclude that the warehouser was negligent.
The purpose of these procedural devices is to permit a plain-
tiff to prove negligence from circumstantial evidence so that the
plaintiff may be compensated for the injury he suffered. These
procedural devices rely upon the same circumstantial evidence to
hold a defendant liable, however, and there is the danger that a
defendant may be held liable for an injury he did not cause. At
the heart of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, therefore, there is a
question about the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for the
proof of negligence. Dean Prosser notes:
It is often said that negligence must be proved, and never
will be presumed. The mere fact that an accident or an
injury occurred, with nothing more, is not evidence of neg-
ligence on the part of anyone.... What is required is evi-
dence, which means some form of proof; and it must be
evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude
that, upon the whole, it is more likely that the event was
caused by negligence than that it was not....
This does not mean, however, that there must be in
every case eyewitnesses of the defendant's conduct. Negli-
gence, like any other fact, may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. This is the evidence of one fact, or of a set of
facts, from which the existence of the fact to be deter-
mined may reasonably be inferred. It involves, in addition
to the assertion of the witnesses as to what they have
observed, a process of reasoning, or inference, by which a
conclusion is drawn....
... Like all other evidence, [circumstantial evidence]
may be strong or weak; it may be so unconvincing as to be
quite worthless, or it may be irresistible and overwhelming.
The gist of it, and the key to it, is the inference, or the process of
reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. This must be based
upon the evidence given, together with a sufficient background of
human experience to justify the conclusion.5°
The conclusion of negligence is only as sound as the inference
upon which it is based, or as the process of reasoning by which
the conclusion is reached.
50. PROssER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToiRrs, supra note 47, § 39, at
24243 (emphasis added).
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The connection between the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and the procedural devices that the courts have developed to
prove racial discrimination is recognized by Don Welch:
One attempt to make sense of 'intent' in a discrimination
context has drawn an analogy to the tort doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Under res ipsa loquitur, an event which does
not normally occur without negligence allows the
factfinder to infer negligence from mere proof of the
event itself. This principle allows a plaintiff to create an
inference of intent through, e.g., the racially dispropor-
tionate impact of an act. Following this line of reasoning,
mere proof of disproportionate impact would allow the
factfinder to infer intent to discriminate51
Welch notes that the courts have overcome the evidentiary diffi-
culties plaintiffs frequently experience in proving racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose by allowing plaintiffs to present
evidence of racially disproportionate effects or results, from
which the factfinder may find racial discrimination.
It is argued that evidence of racially disproportionate results
may be used to prove racial discrimination because racially dis-
proportionate results do not usually occur in the absence of
racially discriminatory purposes, and the defendant is in a better
position than the plaintiff to provide evidence concerning his
purpose. However, evidence of racially disproportionate results
may be used not simply to prove racially discriminatory purpose
through circumstantial evidence, but to presume racial discrimi-
nation in the absence of any evidence of racially discriminatory
purpose. For example, in an early employment discrimination
case, the Supreme Court explained that the rebuttable presump-
tion with a shift in the burden of production device serves to
eliminate the non-discriminatory reasons for an employer's de d -
sion thereby enabling the factfinder to conclude that in the
absence of a non-discriminatory purpose, the employer acted
with a discriminatory purpose:
A prima facia case [of disparate treatment] raises an infer-
ence of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are
51. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatoty Barriers: Basing Disparate
Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent 60 S. CAL. L REv. 733, 774-74
(1987) (advocating the use of the res ipsa loquitur approach to create an
inference of motive: "I] t may be more appropriate to infer the cause of an act
from an act's results, rather than to infer the state of mind of the actor." Id. at
775.)
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willing to presume this largely because we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without underlying reasons, espe-
cially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate rea-
sons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only
with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race.' 2
When a presumption of racial discrimination is created and
the burden of production or persuasion is shifted to the defend-
ant, it is important to examine carefully the presumption of
racial discrimination lest the defendant be held liable for racial
discrimination that he did not cause. As Deborah Malamud says,
"it is by no means certain that any particular unexplained adverse
act toward a woman or a member of a minority group is the
result of discrimination. The question is whether, in the face of
uncertainty, the legal system should use a mandatory presump-
tion instead of requiring individualized proof.""3
It is also important to examine the standard used to provide
the evidence of racially disproportionate results from which
racially discriminatory purpose may be inferred or racial discrim-
ination is presumed. Randall Kennedy explains the significance
of that standard as follows:
The legitimacy of a given standard, however, cannot prop-
erly be determined wholly by reference to consequences
52. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See also
Jessie Allen, A Possible Remedy For Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BRooL L. REv.
1299 (1995) (advocating strict liability for unconscious discrimination: "Like a
res ipsa inference, the burden shift in a disparate treatment case can be seen as
a different way to prove an old standard of liability-in the res ipsa case,
negligence, in the disparate treatment case, subjective intent. The burden shift
may also be seen, though, as a way to shift the standard of what is to be proved.
Because it allows liability to attach for the lack of an explanation, reasons other than the
conventional liability standard may actually be behind the action. Thus, the doctrine
of res ipsa in tort cases involving consumers injured by mass-manufactured
products functioned as a bridge from traditional negligence liability to strict
liability for manufacturing defects. Eventually, the allowance of indirect proof
for res ipsa cases was recognized as a new doctrine of liability for injury due to
defect." Id. at 1332 (emphasis added)).
53. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment Analysis
After Hicks, 93 MicH . L. REv. 2229, 2254-55 (1995). See alsoJody D. Amour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
Negphobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1994) (discussing three different types of self-
defense claims a defendant may advance, each of which requires the
introduction of race-based evidence and arguments to establish the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions.)
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measured by bare statistics .... The statistics generated by
a given standard may well provide a predicate for question-
ing it. Results indicating that a given standard disadvan-
tages the members of one group relative to others may
indicate that the standard itself needs reform. On the
other hand, statistics may indicate that those who failed to
satisfy the criteria in question are themselves in need of
reform. Ascertaining which conclusion to reach in a par-
ticular context always requires more than statistics. It
requires recourse to a complex set of normative and
descriptive assumptions. A statistic, after all, is never self-
explanatory; it always requires interpretation.5
A "fact" which purports to show racial discrimination rarely
"speaks for itself." Whether a purportedly racially disproportion-
ate result evidences a racially discriminatory purpose or estab-
lishes racial discrimination depends upon 'a complex set of
normative and descriptive assumptions.' 55
Should we infer a racially discriminatory purpose, or pre-
sume racial discrimination, from the disproportionately large
number of blacks who are punished for possession of crack
cocaine, and receive disproportionately longer sentences for the
possession of crack cocaine than their white counterparts receive
for the possession of powder cocaine?56 Should we infer a
54. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. LAw.
REv. 1745, 1763 (1989).
55. See, e.g., Rhonda Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up:
Responses to African-Amencan Reparations Theoty in Mainstream and Outsider
Remedies Discourse, 79 Va. L. Rev. 863 (1993) (asserting that the injuries which
African-Americans have suffered as the result of slavery and segregation present
an ideal res ipsa loquitur case for racial reparations, but "the subconscious
persistence of white supremacy as a normative principle" has prevented
"mainstream academics and politicians" from giving the proposal for racial
reparations the attention and respect it deserves. Id. at 2254-55.)
56. See Randall L. Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial
Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1255 (1994) ("[1]n the absence of
discriminatory purpose or discriminatory administration, a facially race neutral
state policy will advantage some African-Americans and disadvantage others,
which precludes the conclusion that such a policy discriminates against African-
Americans as a class.... [W] hat is really at stake [in controversies in which it is
claimed that a facially race neutral state policy disproportionately burdens some
racial minority group] is not simply an inter-racial dispute but an actual or
incipient intra-racial conflict. Although blacks subject to relatively heavy
punishment for crack possession are burdened by it, their black law-abiding
neighbors are presumably helped by it (insofar as the statute deters and
punishes drug trafficking that typically takes place in their midst).... (This]
actual or potential intra-racial conflict[ ] over what policies are good or bad for
a given racial minority group suggests why courts, in the absence of a finding of
discriminatory purpose, should refrain from condemning a state criminal
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racially discriminatory purpose, or presume racial discrimina-
tion, from the disproportionately small number of minority
elected officials? The debate over these matters is usually framed
in terms of whether we should look for evidence of discrimina-
tory intent or purpose, or whether we may rely upon evidence of
discriminatory effects or results.5 7 Our examination of the differ-
ent procedural devices employed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur provides a more nuanced understanding of the prob-
lem, however. The issue is not whether evidence of racially dis-
proportionate results may be used to show racially discriminatory
purpose or racial discrimination-it may. The issue is the pro-
cess of reasoning by which we conclude that there is evidence of
racially disproportionate results, and by which we infer racially
discriminatory purpose or presume the fact of racial discrimina-
tion. The procedural devices we employ shape this process of
reasoning and influence the conclusions we reach.
As I turn to examine the Supreme Court's vote dilution juris-
prudence which has led to the adoption of race-conscious dis-
tricting, and later to examine the Supreme Court's racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence which has led to the questioning
of race-conscious districting, we need to be attentive to the differ-
ent procedural devices the Supreme Court uses in these areas,
and the different conclusions which these procedural devices
influence the Court to draw.
TV. TiE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOTE DILUTlON CLAIM
A. Introduction
There have been three different attempts since the 1960s to
prevent racial discrimination in voting. First, the Voting Rights
Act of 196558 was enacted to ensure voters equal access to regis-
tration and voting. The Act applied a series of special provisions
to any state or locality that used a voting test or device (such as a
literacy test or poll tax) to restrict access to registration and vot-
ing, and in which less than fifty percent of the eligible black citi-
policy as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is only the presence of such
a finding that can justifiably give the judiciary confidence that a challenged
policy fails to meet the minimal demands of constitutional decency." Id. at
1272-74.) See also Melissa C. Brown, Equal /artection in a Mean World: Why Judge
Cahill Was Right In United States v. Clary, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB.
POL'Y 319 (1997).
57. Compare Abigail Thernstrom, Shaw v. Reno: Notes From a Political
Thicket, 1994 PUB. INr. L. REv. 35 (1994) and More Notes From A Political Thicket,
44 EMoRy L.J. 911 (1995) with LAm GuINxa, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrrY,
supra note 19.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
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zens registered and voted in the previous presidential election.
Second, the principle of "one person, one vote" was developed
by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims 9 to ensure that voters
would be assigned to voting districts with substantially equal pop-
ulation, and would not suffer a "dilution" in the "weight" of their
votes on the basis of where they lived. This had the effect of
increasing the voting power of urban districts where many minor-
ity voters lived. Finally, the concept of vote dilution was
expanded by the Congress in an amendment to the Voting
Rights Act in 1982, and by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v.
Gingles, ° to ensure that voters would have an equal "opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect the representa-
tives of their choice," and would not suffer a dilution in the
weight of their vote on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
All three of these attempts to prevent racial discrimination
in voting have employed an "effects test" to establish racially dis-
proportionate results, not racially discriminatory purpose. As the
discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has indicated, it is
important to examine the evidence upon which the conclusion
of racial discrimination is founded. In this section, I will
examine the standards used to establish racially disproportionate
results.
B. Analysis
1. Equal Access to Registration and Voting
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to provide
an entirely new approach for combating widespread and persis-
tent voting discrimination. Instead of litigating individual inci-
dents of voting discrimination, Congress adopted "a complex
scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting dis-
crimination [was] most flagrant."61 Like the Fifteenth Amend-
ment,62 the Voting Rights Act prohibited states and localities*
from using any voting practice to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen to vote on account of race or color.' But unlike previous
59. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
60. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
61. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
62. The Fifteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
63. Sec. 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided in relevant part: "No
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
efforts to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment,
the Act devised a formula under which the Attorney General
could designate particular states and localities which used liter-
acy tests and other devices to deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race or color;" the Act then applied a series of special
provisions to these designated states and localities.
The Act suspended the use of all existing literacy tests and
other devices in these designated states and localities for a period
of five years.' The Act also suspended the use of any new voting
practices until the designated state or locality could prove to the
Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia that the new voting practice
"[did] not have the purpose and [would] not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color."3 The Act excused voters in the designated states and
localities from paying past accumulated poll taxes, and author-
ized the Attorney General to institute litigation to challenge the
constitutionality of all poll taxes. 7 Finally, the Act assigned fed-
eral examiners to the designated states and localities to register
qualified voters,' and federal poll-watchers to determine that
the newly registered voters were permitted to vote, and their
votes were properly tabulated.69
The special provisions of the Voting Rights Act were quickly
upheld by the Supreme Court,70 and the new approach adopted
by the Act successfully removed significant obstacles to the regis-
tration of black voters.7 This new approach incorporated the
use of a discriminatory effects standard for determining voting
discrimination. Any state or locality employing a voting test or
of race or color." The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (1994).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1994).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973f (1994).
70. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
71. "([T]he large jump in the number and percentage of blacks registered
to vote from just prior to the passage of the 1965 Act to just after it [is striking].
The number of registered blacks in the eleven southern states in this period
jumped from approximately 2 million to 2.9 million, an increase of nearly
900,000, or 45 percent. In the first few months after the passage of the Act
more than 300,000 blacks were registered .... Nearly three-quarters as many
blacks registered to vote merely in the two years after passage of the Act as had
been registered in all the years prior to 1957." GERALD N. RoSFNBERG, THE
HoLLow HoPE: CAN COURTS BruNG ABouT SocILx CHANeC? 60-61 (1991).
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device' which had the result that less than fifty percent of the
residents either registered or voted in the previous presidential
election was presumed to have engaged in voting discrimination,
and was subjected to the special provisions of the Act."'
Although the Attorney General and private individuals could
continue to challenge in court particular racially discriminatory
voting practices,74 the Attorney General could also simply deter-
mine that the state or locality had engaged in voting discrimina-
tion under the formula provided by the Act, and the state or
locality's racially discriminatory voting practices would automati-
cally be suspended. Furthermore, the Attorney General's deter-
mination was not subject to judicial review.75
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 used a rebuttable presump-
tion with a shift in the burden of persuasion device to establish
that certain states and localities maintained racially discrimina-
tory voting practices. Under this original version of the Act, the
injury was the denial or abridgment of the opportunity to regis-
ter and vote. The injury was assumed to be caused by the use of
racially discriminatory voting tests or devices, such as a literacy
test or poll tax. The remedy was the suspension of the voting
tests or devices. The standard which was used to provide the evi-
dence from which the presumption was raised that the state
maintained a racially discriminatory voting practice was the use
of voting tests or devices, and the registration and voting in the
72. The Act defined a voting test or device as "any requirement that a
person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate
the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate
any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3)
possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of
registered voters of members of any other class." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1994);
73. The special provisions of the Act applied to any state or locality which
the Attorney General determined had maintained a voting test or device on
November 1, 1964, and in which less than fifty percent of the voting age
residents were registered to vote or voted in the 1964 presidential election. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1994).
75. The Attorney General's determination that a state or locality was
subject to the special provisions of the Act was not subject to judicial review. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994). But a state or locality could seek a declaratory
judgment from a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia that the state or locality had not used a test or device to prevent a
citizen from voting on account of race or color in the previous five years. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1994). The special provisions of the Act could not be
applied to any state or locality which had only a few voting discrimination
incidents, and the voting tests or devices which caused the incidents had been
eliminated and were unlikely to recur. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(d) (1994).
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previous presidential election of less than fifty percent of eligible
black citizens.
In the context of the times, it was clear that many voting
tests and devices had a racially disproportionate impact, and it
was reasonable to presume that states and localities maintained
such tests and devices for racially discriminatory purposes.
Thanks in large part to the success of the Voting Rights Act and
other civil rights measures designed to end racial discrimination,
it is not clear that it would be reasonable to presume such a pur-
pose today.76 Because the Act was adopted by Congress, and
focused on the narrow issue of providing access to registration
and voting, it avoided many of the problems associated with judi-
cially-created remedies. The discriminatory effects tests that the
Supreme Court developed in Reynolds v. Sims 77 and Thornburg v.
Ginges78 would not be so fortunate.
2. Vote Dilution I: The Principle of "One Person, One Vote"
During the early 1960s, the Supreme Court also developed a
separate constitutional voting rights claim under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to address the mal-
apportionment of voting strength between rural and urban
districts. In Baker v. Carr,' the Court held for the first time that a
complaint alleging that a state legislative apportionment plan
unconstitutionally deprived voters of the equal protection of the
laws was a claim suitable for adjudication by the federal courts.
The Court did not discuss the proper constitutional standards for
evaluating the validity of a state legislative apportionment plan,
or the appropriate remedy for redressing an unconstitutional
apportionment plan. The Court simply asserted that "U]udicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed
and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular
facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but sim-
ply arbitrary and capricious action." °
76. See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996)
(Court held that a private right of action exists under the Voting Rights Act to
challenge the requirement that persons desiring to become delegates to a state
political party's nominating convention pay a registration fee to cover the cost
of the convention.)
77. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a discussion of this case see Sec. IV.B.2 infra.
78. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). For a discussion of this case see Sec. W.B.6 infra.
79. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
80. Id. at 226.
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Although in Gray v. Sanders"1 the Supreme Court again
declined to specify the standards for evaluating or the remedy for
redressing an unconstitutional apportionment, the Court
announced the principle of "one person, one vote." The Court
held that Georgia's use of a county unit system"' for tabulating
votes in statewide primary elections was unconstitutional because
it resulted in the dilution of the weight of the vote of certain
voters merely based on where they lived:
81. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
82. The county unit system is similar to the Electoral College system used
to elect the President of the United States. Each county has a number of
county unit votes equivalent to the number of representatives it elects to the
state legislature. Any candidate who receives a plurality of the popular vote in a
county would receive all of that county's unit votes. The candidate who receives
the most county unit votes would become the party's nominee for a particular
statewide office, such as Governor. Gray, 372 U.S. at 370-71.
For the purpose of deciding this case, the Court found the analogy
between Georgia's county unit system and the Electoral College system
inapposite:
The inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the result
of specific historical concerns, validated the collegiate principle
despite its inherent numerical inequality, but implied nothing about
the use of an analogous system by a State in a statewide election. No
such specific accommodation of the latter was ever undertaken, and
therefore no validation of its numerical inequality ensued.
Passage of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments shows that this conception of political equality belongs
to a bygone day, and should not be considered in determining what
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
in statewide elections.
IL at 378, 377 n. 8.
However, the county unit system is not unconstitutional per se; it is uncon-
stitutional only if the apportionment of representatives to the state legislature
upon which the county unit system is based is itself unconstitutional. For exam-
ple, under the Georgia state constitution the state's eight most populous coun-
ties sent three representatives to the lower chamber of the state legislature, the
next thirty most populous counties sent two representatives, and the remaining
counties sent one representative. This system resulted in tremendous disparity
between the most populous and least populous counties. Fulton County, the
most populous county in Georgia, had 14.11% of Georgia's total population but
only 1.46% of Georgia's total unit votes (or a voting strength equivalent to one-
tenth of the County's percentage of statewide population). But Echols County,
the least populous county in Georgia, had 0.05% of Georgia's total population
but 0.48% of Georgia's total unit votes (or a voting strength equivalent to ten
times the County's percentage of statewide population). A unit vote in Fulton
County represented 92,721 residents, whereas a unit vote in Echols County rep-
resented 938 residents. Thus, the weight of the vote of a resident in Fulton
County was only 1% of the weight of the vote of a resident in Echols County. Id.
at 371.
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How then can one person be given twice or ten times the
voting power of another person in a state-wide election
merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives
in the smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit
for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all
who participate in the election are to have an equal vote-
whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their
occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their
home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The concept of "we the people" under the Constitu-
tion visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality
among those who meet the basic qualifications.
The conception of political liberty from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fif-
teenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing-one person, one vote.8 3
The Supreme Court finally determined the standards for
evaluating the apportionment of state legislative districts under
the Equal Protection Clause in Reynolds v Sims.s' Reasserting the
principle it had first articulated in Gray, the Court argued that
diluting the weight of votes on the basis of where the voter lived
impaired a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amend-
mentjust as much as invidious discrimination based on race:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions
on that right strike at the heart of representative govern-
ment. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debase-
ment or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise.s'
The Court found the analogy between the Alabama state legisla-
ture and the scheme of representation followed by the United
States Congress to be inapposite," and held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause required the state to reapportion the districts for
both chambers of its legislature on an equal population basis:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a state make
an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population
83. Id. at 379-80, 381.
84. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85. Id. at 555.
86. Id at 575-76.
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as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossibil-
ity to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an
identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Math-
ematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable consti-
tutional requirement.
So long as divergences from a strict population standard
are based on legitimate considerations incident to the
effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from
the equal-population principle are constitutionally permis-
sible ....87
Among the considerations a state might use to justify deviation
from the equal-population principle, the Court indicated that
making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, and
preventing political gerrymandering might qualify as legitimate
state interests.8 The Court also noted that multi-member dis-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 578. Earlier, the Supreme Court had determined the standards
for evaluating the apportionment of congressional districts under Art. I, sec. 2
of the Constitution in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court held
that a complaint alleging that a state congressional apportionment plan
unconstitutionally diluted the weight of the vote of certain voters presented a
justiciable claim. The Court determined that one person's vote in a
congressional election should be worth as much as another person's "as nearly
as is practicable." Id. at 7-8. "While it may not be possible to draw congressional
districts with mathematical precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our
Constitution's plain objective of making equal representation for equal
numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives." Id.
at 18.
Despite its disclaimer, the Court pursued the objective of equal
representation for equal numbers of people to the point of mathematical
precision-at least for the House of Representatives. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1964), the Court rejected a Missouri congressional districting
plan that deviated from absolute population equality by 3%. The Court insisted
that deviations from absolute population equality would not be justified on de
minimus grounds, nor by a desire to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions,
nor even to deter political gerrymandering. "[T]he 'as nearly as practicable'
standard requires the State to make a good faith effort to achieve precise
mathematical equality." Id. at 530-31. Later, in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725 (1983), the Court rejected a New Jersey congressional districting plan that
deviated from absolute population equality by less than 0.7%. The Court again
refused to acknowledge a de minimus exception unless the state could show that
more precise results could not be achieved with the best available census data.
However, the Court indicated that consistently applied legislative policies (such
as making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving core
areas of prior districts, or avoiding contests between incumbents) might justify
some deviation from absolute population equality. Id. at 740.
The Court has declined to pursue precise mathematical equality for state
legislative districts. In Brown v Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), handed down
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tricts-which would become the next focus of the Court's vote
dilution jurisprudence-might be justified by these legitimate
state interests.8 9
Like the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Court's vote dilution
jurisprudence used a rebuttable presumption with a shift in the
burden of persuasion device to establish that states diluted the
weight of the vote of certain voters based on where they lived.
The injury was the dilution of the weight of the vote of certain
voters. The injury was assumed to be caused by the assignment
of voters to districts of unequal population. The remedy was the
assignment of voters to districts of substantially equal population.
The standard which was used to provide the evidence from which
the presumption was raised that a state diluted the weight of the
vote of certain voters was the principle of "one person, one vote"
and the assignment of voters to districts of unequal population.
The presumption that a state diluted the weight of the vote of
certain voters shifted to the state the burden of producing evi-
dence that the assignment of voters to districts of unequal popu-
lation was rationally related to the achievement of some
legitimate state interest.
The standard that the Court used to provide the evidence
from which the presumption was raised that a state diluted the
weight of the vote of certain voters-the principle of "one per-
son, one vote"-was designed to detect the disparity between
rural districts and urban or suburban districts, not the disparity
between white voters and minority voters. It is not a standard
derived from the text or history of the Constitution, or from the
text of a statute. In fact, the standard is inconsistent with the
principles of representation used to elect the Senate and the
President. The standard may provide evidence from which the
presumption of an "injury" may properly be drawn, but such an
"injury" is not recognized by the Constitution, and does not
authorize the Court to devise a remedy. Nevertheless, this stan-
dard has been used to transform how states and localities elect
their legislative, executive, and judicial officials, and the use of
this standard has called into question the Court's authority and
competence to affect such a transformation.
Several members of the Court were clearly troubled by the
direction of the Court's vote dilution jurisprudence, and ques-
the same day as Karcher, the Court upheld a Wyoming state legislative districting
plan that deviated from absolute population equality by an average of 16% and
a maximum of 89%. The Court determined that the state's historical
adherence to county boundaries justified a disparity of even this magnitude. Id.
at 843.
89. Reynold, 377 U.S. at 579.
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tioned the Court's authority and competence to develop a vote
dilution standard and impose a vote dilution remedy. Justice
Frankfurter argued that vote dilution claims presented a nonjus-
ticiable political question, and criticized the Court's "hypotheti-
cal claim resting on abstract assumptions:"'
What, then, is this question of legislative apportion-
ment? Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have
their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and
their votes are counted. They go to the polls, they cast
their ballots, they send their representatives to the state
councils. Their complaint is simply that the representa-
tives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful-in short,
that Tennessee has adopted a basis of representation with
which they are dissatisfied. Talk of "debasement" or "dilu-
tion" is circular talk. One cannot speak of "debasement"
or "dilution" of the value of a vote until there is first
defined a standard of reference as to what a vote should be
worth. What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to
choose among competing bases of representation-ulti-
mately, really, among competing theories of political phi-
losophy-in order to establish an appropriate frame of
government for the State of Tennessee and thereby for all
the States of the Union. 91
Justice Harlan argued that federal jurisdiction over vote dilu-
tion claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was explicitly denied by § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 92 And like Justice Frankfurter, he criticized the
Court for entering into an area for which there were no judicially
manageable standards:
Generalities cannot obscure the cold truth that cases
of this type are not amenable to the development of judi-
cial standards. No set of standards can guide a court which
has to decide how many legislative districts a State shall
have, or what the shape of the districts shall be, or where to
draw a particular district line. No judicially manageable
standard can determine whether a State should have sin-
gle-member districts or multimember districts or some
combination of both. No such standard can control the
balance between keeping up with population shifts and
having stable districts. In all these respects, the courts will
be called upon to make particular decisions with respect to
90. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 299-300.
92. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 593-608 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
which a principle of equally populated districts will be of
no assistance whatsoever.
93
Justices O'Connor and Thomas would later return to these
criticisms when they questioned the direction of the Court's vote
dilution jurisprudence,94 but during the initial phase in the
development of that vote dilution jurisprudence, the Court
merely acknowledged the warning and asserted its power:
We are told that the matter of apportioning represen-
tation in a state legislature is a complex and many-faceted
one. We are advised that States can rationally consider fac-
tors other than population in apportioning legislative rep-
resentation. We are admonished not to restrict the power
of the States to impose differing views as to political philos-
ophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dan-
gers of entering into political thickets and mathematical
quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally
protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and
our office require no less of us."
3. Vote Dilution II: "The Opportunity to Participate in the
Political Process and Elect the Representatives of
One's Choice"
Ignoring the warning ofJustices Frankfurter and Harlan, the
Supreme Court soon expanded the scope of its vote dilution
claim in a series of cases challenging the constitutionality of
multi-member districts under the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court had noted in Reynolds v. Sims that multi-member districts
were not unconstitutional per se.9 However, the Court now
began to entertain claims that multi-member districts "operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population."9 7 To sustain such claims the
racial or political group allegedly discriminated against had to do
more than show that it had not elected representatives in propor-
tion to its numbers:
93. Id. at 621.
94. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) and Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
96. Id. at 579.
97. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971), quoting Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88
(1966).
1997] RACE/IPSA
254 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY (Vol. 11
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support
findings that the political processes leading to nomination
and election were not equally open to participation by the
group in question-that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.98
The plaintiffs could establish vote dilution by proving the exist-
ence of a number of factors:
[W] here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the
process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legis-
lators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state pol-
icy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in
general precludes the effective participation in the elec-
tion system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced
by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority
vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions, and
the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from
particular geographical subdistricts. 99
The existence of an aggregation of these factors was sufficient to
establish the fact of vote dilution; the plaintiff did not need to
prove the existence of all of the factors.1
In these cases, the Court attempted to use a permissive infer-
ence device to expand the scope of its vote dilution jurispru-
dence to cover these claims that particular state voting practices
diminished the opportunity of certain voters to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. The
injury was the diminished opportunity of certain voters to partici-
pate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice. The cause of the injury and the remedy for the injury
were unclear. The standard which was used to provide the evi-
dence from which the inference was drawn that a state had
diminished the opportunity of certain voters to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice was a
multiple-f-actor "totality of the circumstances" test. The inference
that a state had diminished the opportunity of certain voters to
98. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (emphasis added).
99. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), affid on
other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976) (per curium). See also Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 143-44, 149-50 and White,
412 U.S. at 766. But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 (1980) and
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 619-20 (1982) (Court noted that it affirmed the
judgment in Zimmer "without approval of the constitutional views expressed by
the court of appeals.")
100. Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305.
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participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice did not shift the burden of production or persuasion
to the state.
The totality of the circumstances standard which was used to
provide the evidence from which the inference was drawn that a
state had diminished the opportunity of certain voters to partici-
pate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice was too imprecise to support such an inference: too many
factors extraneous to the state's voting practice could explain the
voters' inability to achieve the degree of political success they
expected. The lack of a more specific and objective standard
hampered the progress of such claims, and the Court ultimately
abandoned the use of the discriminatory effects test for establish-
ing vote dilution in City of Mobile v. Bolden.101 When the Congress
amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to incorporate the dis-
criminatory effects test, the Court was forced to wrestle with this
problem once again in Thornburg v. Gingles.'12
4. The Rejection of the Discriminatory Effects Test for
Determining Vote Dilution
In the fifteen years that followed the enactment of the Vot-
ing Right Act, the Court sustained only one claim that multi-
member districts unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength
of racial or political minority groups.1 03  Then, the Court
attempted to reconcile its vote dilution jurisprudence with other
aspects of its equal protection jurisprudence, 0 4 and abandoned
101. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
102. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). For a discussion of this case see Sec. IV.B.6 infra.
103. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (multi-member districts in
Dallas and Bexar Counties of Texas invidiously excluded blacks and hispanics
from effective participation in political processes.)
104. Se Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Note that
the discriminatory purpose test in Washington v. Davis employs a permissive
inference device which allows the factfinder to infer discriminatory purpose
from circumstantial evidence of discriminatory results:
[A] n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law
bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not
infrequently true that discriminatory impact... may for all practical
purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various
circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on
nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government
to pursue, is invalid under [the Equal Protection Clause] simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than another.
Disproportionate impact is not irelevant, but it is not the touchstone of an
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the use of the discriminatory effects test for establishing vote
dilution. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,'°5 the appellees brought a
class action suit on behalf of the black residents of Mobile, Ala-
bama alleging that the practice of electing the city's three com-
missioners at-large diluted the voting strength of the city's black
residents in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. The district
court found that the at-large election of the city commissioners
diluted the voting strength of the city's black residents and
ordered the city to establish a mayor-council plan of government
with council members elected from single-member districts.10 6
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings and
order.10 7
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding and
order, with a plurality of the Court rejecting the use of a discrimi-
natory effects test for establishing vote dilution.01 First, the plu-
rality found that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act simply restated the
prohibitions contained in the Fifteenth Amendment and did not
create a separate statutory vote dilution claim. "[T] he language
of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and the sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear
that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of
the Fifteenth Amendment itself."" ° Second, the plurality stated
that plaintiffs had to prove that the voting practice was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose in order to sustain a constitutional
vote dilution claim under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments:
Although dicta may be drawn from a few of the Court's
earlier opinions suggesting that disproportionate effects
alone may establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote
dilution, the fact is that such a view is not supported by any
decision of this Court. More importantly, such a view is
not consistent with the meaning of the Equal Protection
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing
alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial dassifications are to be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations.
Id. at 229, 242 (1976) (emphasis added).
105. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
106. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
107. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
108. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the plurality of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the result, and Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
109. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61.
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Clause as it has been understood in a variety of other con-
texts involving alleged racial discrimination. 1
0
The plurality pointed to a passage in Whitcomb which stated that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the multi-member districts
at issue in the case "were conceived or operated as purposeful
devices to further racial or economic discrimination.""' The
plurality also noted that in White v. Regester the district court had
relied upon "evidence in the record which included a long his-
tory of racial discrimination against minorities as well as indiffer-
ence to their needs and interests on the part of white elected
officials"' 2 -- evidence which would support a finding of pur-
poseful discrimination. Finally, the plurality distinguished Zim-
mer by noting that it was decided before Washington v. Davis"5
and therefore "was quite evidently decided upon the misunder-
standing that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose
in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause-
that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient."" 4
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall contended that a
plaintiff did not have to prove discriminatory purpose to sustain
a constitutional vote dilution claim under either the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments. Justice Marshall argued that the
Court had failed to distinguish between vote dilution claims pre-
mised upon the "suspect classification" branch of equal protec-
tion cases, and vote dilution claims premised upon the
"fundamental rights" branch." 5 Vote dilution claims premised
on the use of a suspect classification, such as race, do require
proof of discriminatory purpose." 6  However, vote dilution
claims premised on the interference with a fundamental right,
such as the right to vote, are not premised on racial discrimina-
tion and merely require proof of discriminatory effects." 7 Fur-
thermore, vote dilution claims involving the abridgment of the
fundamental right to vote could be brought under the Four-
110. Id. at 67-68.
111. VWhitomb, 403 U.S. at 149.
112. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 69.
113. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
114. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 71.
115. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 113-14, 120-21. InJustice Marshall's view, Rqnoldsv. Sims and
White v. Regester would be examples of vote dilution claims involving the
abridgment of the fundamental right to vote; Gomillion v. Lightfoot would be an
example of a vote dilution claim involving the use of a suspect racial
classification. For a discussion of Gomillion v. Lightfoo4 see Sec. V.B.1 infra
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teenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, or the Voting
Rights Act. 18
With the Court's decision in Bolden, there emerged two com-
peting conceptions of the Court's vote dilution jurisprudence.
Both conceptions unified the standards for evaluating constitu-
tional vote dilution claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments as well as statutory vote dilution claims under the
Voting Rights Act, but one conception used a discriminatory pur-
pose standard and the other used a discriminatory effects stan-
dard. Congress would soon amend the Voting Rights Act to
incorporate the discriminatory effects standard rejected by the
plurality of the Court in Bolden. States, frequently at the urging
of the Department ofJustice or the federal district courts, would
soon begin to create race-conscious districts to avoid vote dilu-
tion claims. But the Supreme Court would remain divided on
the issue. The Court continues to entertain statutory vote dilu-
tion claims under the amended Voting Rights Act, and uses a
discriminatory effects standard to evaluate such claims. How-
ever, the Court has never determined whether the discriminatory
effects standard applies to constitutional vote dilution claims
under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, or
whether the incorporation of the discriminatory effects standard
in the amended Voting Rights Act transcends congressional
authority to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. Furthermore, the Court in Shaw would
come to use vote dilution claims premised upon the "suspect
classification" branch of the Equal Protection Clause to limit the
creation of race-conscious districts premised upon the "funda-
mental rights" branch of the Equal Protection Clause.
5. The Return of the Discriminatory Effects Test for
Determining Vote Dilution
In 1982, the Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
to incorporate a discriminatory effects test for determining
whether a state had denied or abridged a citizen's right to vote
on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority
group.119 The amended § 2 provides as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
118. Id. at 128.
119. The Voting Rights Act had been amended in 1975 to include
language minority groups. The term "language minority group" refers to
persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaska Natives, or of
Spanish heritage. 42 U.S.C. § 19731 (c) (3) (1994).
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applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color [or membership in a language minority group].
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is
established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citi-
zens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.120
The amendment was clearly designed to overrule the plurality's
holding in Bolden that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act simply
restated the prohibitions contained in the Fifteenth Amendment
and did not create a separate statutory vote dilution claim.
12 1
The Congress rejected the plurality's discriminatory purpose
standard, and endorsed Justice Marshall's discriminatory effects
standard. The Congress used the language of White v. Regester to
define vote dilution: vote dilution occurs when "members [of a
protected class] have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to influence the political process and to elect the rep-
resentatives of their choice. " 12 2 The Congress also used the total-
ity of circumstances test to establish vote dilution, but the text of
the amendment only specified one factor which could be used to
establish vote dilution-lack of electoral success-and provided
that that factor could not be used to establish a right to propor-
tional representation. The Congress did not resolve the tension
between these two statements: if a group is not entitled to receive
proportional representation, how much representation is it enti-
tled to receive? How much representation must a group be
denied before it has a valid vote dilution claim?'
23
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) & (b) (1994) (emphasis added).
121. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61.
122. Compare White 412 U.S. at 766, quoted in the text at fn. 98 supra.
123. See James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:
Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act 69 Va. L.
Rev. 633 (1983). Blumstein concludes that the amendment of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act in 1986 "gives minorities an affirmative entitlement to ballot access
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The Congress also did not resolve the question of its author-
ity for amending the Act to incorporate the discriminatory effects
test. The plurality of the Court in Bolden had held that constitu-
tional vote dilution claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments required proof of discriminatory purpose. How
could the Congress, then, in the exercise of its powers to enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, establish a statutory
vote dilution claim which required a lesser standard of proof?24
6. The Implementation of the Discriminatory Effects Test for
Determining Vote Dilution
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve these problems in
Thornburg v. Gingles.'25 In Thomburg, several black registered
voters had challenged one single-member and six multi-member
state legislative districts, alleging that the districting plan
impaired the ability of black citizens to elect representatives of
their choice in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. After the
complaint was filed, but before the case reached trial, Congress
amended the Voting Rights Act to adopt a discriminatory effects
standard for determining vote dilution. The district court
applied a totality of the circumstances test using the factors out-
lined in the Senate Report on the Voting Rights Act of 1982, and
held that the districting plan resulted in the dilution of black
citizens' votes in all seven challenged districts."
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district
court with respect to all but one of the multi-member districts.'2
Like the district court, the Supreme Court first looked to the
Senate Report for guidance as to the nature of this vote-dilution
claim:
Although the Senate Report espouses a flexible, fact-
intensive test for § 2 violations, it limits the circumstances
under which § 2 violations may be proved in three ways.
but [does not] give minorities an affirmative entitlement to proportional
representation." Id. at 636. Although I agree with much of Blumstein's
analysis, his article was written before the Supreme Court's decision in
Thornburg v. Gingle, and therefore does not account for the court's use of § 2
.as an engine of destruction for at-large elections and as a vehicle for bringing
about the court-ordered adoption of districting systems." IM at 711.
124. For the Court's most recent discussion of Congress's enforcement
powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see City of Boerne v. Flores,
1997 WL 345322 (U.S. Tex.).
125. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
126. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
127. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77.
RACE /PSA
First, electoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not
be considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must demon-
strate that, under the totality of circumstances, the devices
result in unequal access to the electoral process. Second,
the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral mecha-
nism and the lack of proportional representation alone
does not establish a violation. Third, the results test does
not assume the existence of racial bloc voting; plaintiffs
must prove it.12
The Senate Report indicated that the new discriminatory effects
test was designed to employ the same permissive inference device
with the same totality of the circumstances standard the Court
had developed in White v. Regester. Unlike the denial of access to
registration and voting under the original Act, vote dilution
would not be presumed from a lack of proportional representa-
tion: plaintiffs would retain the burden of proving vote dilution.
But the Court rejected this approach and developed three pre-
conditions for establishing a prima facia case of vote dilution and
shifting the burden of production to the state:
These circumstances are necessary preconditions for multi-
member districts to operate to impair minority voters' abil-
ity to elect representatives of their choice for the following
reasons. First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate
that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to consti-
tute a majority in a single-member district. If it is not, as would
be the case in a substantially integrated district, the multi-
member form of the district cannot be responsible for minor-
ity voters' inability to elect its candidates. Second, the minor-
ity group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the
minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said
that the selection of a multimenber electoral structure
thwarts distinctive minority group interests. Thir4, the
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -in the absence of special
circumstances, such as the minority candidate running
unopposed-usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
In establishing this last circumstance, the minority group
demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember
district impeded its ability to elect its chosen
representatives. 129
The Court expected these three preconditions-(1) a large and
geographically compact minority;, (2) a politically cohesive
128. Id. at 46 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added & citations omitted).
1997]
262 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11
minority; and (3) racial bloc voting by the majority-to provide a
more effective standard for determining vote dilution. The key
to this standard is the relationship between the minority group's
opportunity to elect the representatives of its choice and the
white majority's propensity to elect the representatives of its
choice. Minority groups tend to lose elections unless they are
able to forge coalitions and effectively become a part of a major-
ity. However, if a minority group is able to identify a voting prac-
tice that could give it a better opportunity to win elections, it
could use the vote dilution provision of the Voting Rights Act to
compel a state or locality to adopt such a practice. Single-mem-
ber majority-minority districts were the voting practice selected
to give minority group a better opportunity to win elections.
After selecting the single-member majority-minority district
as the benchmark for determining vote dilution under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, the Court needed to address five questions to
clarify this new standard: First, is the failure to concentrate
minority voters into majority-minority districts vote dilution? Sec-
ond, is the concentration of minority voters into majority-minor-
ity districts vote dilution? Third, how many majority-minority
districts must a state or locality create to avoid vote dilution?
Fourth, are single-member majority-minority districts the appro-
priate benchmark for determining vote dilution? Finally, does
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
place a constitutional limit on the creation of majority-minority
districts?
7. The Failure to Create Majority-Minority Districts May Cause
Vote Dilution
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the
Gingles vote dilution test to single-member districts in Growe v.
Emison. ° In Growe, the appellees had challenged an existing
state legislative districting plan under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, alleging that the plan unnecessarily fragmented two Indian
reservations and the minority population of the city of Minneap-
olis. The appellees had sought declaratory relief from the dis-
tricting plan and continued judicial supervision of any legislative
effort to design a new districting plan. A three-judge panel of
130. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
131. Growe also consolidated two other suits: Cotlow v. Growe, No. C8-91-
985, a state action in which the parties stipulated that the existing 1983
congressional and legislative districting plans were unconstitutionally
malapportioned in light of the 1990 census; and Benson v. Growe, No. 4-91-
603, a federal action in which the Republican minority leaders of the state
house and senate alleged that the state legislature's proposed legislative
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the district court determined that any state legislative districting
plan which did not include a majority-minority district for the
city of Minneapolis necessarily violated § 2.112 The district court
imposed congressional and legislative districting plans developed
by its own special masters, and enjoined the state legislature and
state supreme court from developing their own districting
plans. 133
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written byJus-
tice Scalia, reversed the decision of the district court. The Court
was clearly troubled by the district court's remedy for an assumed
vote dilution. The district court, having found that the minority
population of Minneapolis was unconstitutionally fragmented,
interfered with the state's responsibility for apportioning its con-
gressional and legislative districts, and devised an oddly-shaped
majority- minority district that stretched from southern part of
the city, around the downtown area, into the northern part of
the city, to link at least three separately identifiable minority
groups."3 But instead of anticipating the type of claim it would
soon develop in Shaw, the Supreme Court chose to focus on the
district court's finding of vote dilution rather than on its remedy
for the assumed vote dilution. The Court noted that the district
court had failed to identify the particular legislative districting
plan which produced the vote dilution, 13 5 and had failed to apply
the three Ging/es threshold factors in determining that vote dilu-
tion had occurred.3 6 "Unless these points are established, there
neither has been a wrong nor can be remedy." 13 7 The Court
found that the Gingles preconditions "were not only ignored but
were unattainable."13 The Court argued that the combination
of distinct ethnic and language minority groups to create a geo-
graphically compact 'majority' (the first Ginges factor) was a
dubious undertaking, and acknowledged that statistical or anec-
districting plan was unconstitutional, but not illegal under the Voting Rights
Act. The state supreme court developed congressional and legislative
districting plans as a result of the Cotlow suit, in case the state legislature was
unable to develop its own plans. See Growe 507 U.S. at 27-29.
132. Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427 (D. Minn. 1992).
133. Id at 448-49. The state legislature had developed new congressional
and legislative districting plans, but these plans were vetoed by the Governor.
The state supreme court had developed a new legislative districting plan and
was developing a new congressional districting plan when the district court
issued its injunction. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 28-31.
134. Id. at 38.
135. Grow 507 U.S. at 39.
136. Id. at 39-40.
137. Id. at 40-41.
138. Id. at 41.
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dotal evidence of minority political cohesion or majority bloc vot-
ing in Minneapolis (the second and third Ging/e factors) was
lacking.13 9
In Growe, the Court addressed the first of the questions
about the use of race-conscious districting: is the failure to con-
centrate minority voters into race-conscious districts vote dilu-
tion? Although the Court found that the district court had not
demonstrated that the minority groups in this case Were suffi-
ciently geographically compact or politically cohesive to warrant
the creation of race-conscious districts, the Court implied that in
the proper circumstances the failure to create race-conscious dis-
tricts could constitute vote dilution. The Court reminded the
district courts to defer to the states for the development of con-
gressional and legislative districting plans, and warned the dis-
trict courts to order the creation of race-conscious districts only
after finding vote dilution under the Ginges test.
Although the Court determined that district courts could
not create race-conscious districts without first finding vote dilu-
tion under the Ginges test, the Court did not address whether
states could create race-conscious districts without first finding
vote dilution under the Ginges test. The Court also declined to
address the benchmark question of whether it is better to con-
centrate minority voters into majority-minority districts to ensure
the election of a few minority representatives, or to disperse
minority voters into minority-influence districts to influence the
election of several non-minority representatives. 14 The Court
would confront both of these questions in Voinovich v. Quilter,
which it decided a week after Growe.
8. The Creation of Majority-Minority Districts May Also Cause
Vote Dilution
The Supreme Court refined the application of the Ging&e
vote dilution test to single-member districts in Voinovich v.
Qui/ter.141 In Voinovich, two Democratic members of the Ohio
state reapportionment board challenged a state legislative dis-
tricting plan adopted by the board's three Republican members
which created several majority-minority districts. The appellees
argued that plan diluted minority voting strength because it con-
centrated black voters into majority-minority districts instead of
dispersing them into minority-influence districts, thereby mini-
mizing the number of districts in which black voters could elect
139. Id.
140. Id. at 41 n.5.
141. 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
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the candidates of their choice. The appellants contended that
the plan actually enhanced minority voting strength because it
provided "safe" majority-minority districts in which black voters
could be assured of electing the candidates of their choice.
A three-judge panel of the district court rejected the appel-
lant's contention that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the
creation of majority-minority districts "whenever possible," and
held that § 2 prohibited the creation of such districts unless nec-
essary to remedy a violation of § 2.11 When the state apportion-
ment board was unable to prove that the majority-minority
districts in its plan were necessary to remedy vote dilution, the
district court ordered the state to reschedule its primary elec-
tions for the general assembly,"4 and appointed a special master
to prepare a legislative districting plan.'
The Supreme Court first stayed the district court's order,"
and then reversed the district court's decision." In another
unanimous opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
declined to decide whether the failure to create minority-influ-
ence districts constituted a cognizable vote dilution claim under
§ 2.147 The Court determined that § 2 did not contain a per se
prohibition against the creation of majority-minority districts,
and rejected the district court's contention that the use of such
districts was limited to those circumstances where they were
needed to remedy a violation of § 2.11 The Court acknowledged
that the creation of majority-minority districts could raise a vote
dilution claim, but the burden of proof rested with the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the creation of majority-minority districts
constituted vote dilution, not with the state to demonstrate that
the creation of such districts was necessary to remedy vote
dilution.149
In Voinovich the Court addressed the second of the questions
about the use of race-conscious districting: is the concentration
of minority voters into race-conscious districts vote dilution?
Although the Court avoided a direct answer to this question by
declining to decide whether the failure to create minority-influ-
ence districts constituted vote dilution, the Court acknowledged
that in the proper circumstances the creation of race-conscious
142. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 699, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
143. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
144. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 756, 757 (NJ). Ohio 1992).
145. Voinovich v. Quilter, 503 U.S. 979 (1992).
146. Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 152.
147. Id. at 154.
148. Id. at 155.
149. Id. at 155-56.
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districts could constitute vote dilution. As we shall see, this is an
issue of some importance in the development of the racial gerry-
mandering claim in Shaw v. Reno. The dissenters in Shaw"
would argue that a vote dilution violation is the only limit upon
the states' authority to create race-conscious districts. One part
of the majority in Shaw15 1 would argue that a vote dilution viola-
tion is a separate and subordinate statutory limit upon the states'
authority to create race-conscious districts. The principal limit is
a racial gerrymandering violation under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Another part of the
majority in Shaw 52 would reject the entire vote dilution enter-
prise, and would argue that the Equal Protection Clause raises a
significant constitutional barrier to the creation of race-conscious
districts for any purpose.
The Court also addressed an issue left unresolved in Growe.
The Court determined that states could create race-conscious dis-
tricts without first finding vote dilution under the Gingles test.
The scope of this authority would not be determined until the
dimensions of the racial gerrymandering claim, recognized in
Shaw, were finalized in Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera Finally, the
Court did not address whether states may create race-conscious
districts wherever possible, even where minority voters do not
reside in geographically compact districts. The Court would con-
front this issue in Shaw v. Reno, but it would not resolve the issue
until Johnson v. DeGrandy.
9. The Rejection of the Maximization Principle
The Supreme Court addressed the Justice Department's pol-
icy of requiring states to maximize the concentration of minority
voters into majority-minority districts in Johnson v. De Grandy.153
The convoluted factual circumstances of this case give a taste of
the difficulties states now encounter when they redesign voting
districts. On the opening day of the 1992 regular state legislative
session, Miguel De Grandy, an Hispanic state representative, and
several registered voters filed a complaint alleging that Florida's
existing congressional and legislative districts were unconstitu-
tionally malapportioned in light of the 1990 census. A three-
judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida initially dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction. However, when the state legislature adjourned
150. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.
151. Justice O'Connor with ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Kennedy.
152. Justice Thomas with Justice Scalia.
153. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
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its regular session without adopting new congressional or legisla-
tive districting plans, the panel consolidated an amended com-
plaint by De Grandy with a similar complaint filed by the Florida
Conference of NAACP Branches, and established an expedited
schedule for adopting new districting plans before the July dead-
line for candidate qualification.
The Governor convened a special legislative session which
drafted a new legislative districting plan but was unable to agree
on a new congressional districting plan. The Florida Supreme
Court issued a declaratory judgment validating the state legisla-
tive districting plans."M The plan for the 120 house districts
included thirteen black majority-minority districts, nine hispanic
majority-minority districts, three black minority-influence dis-
tricts, and seven hispanic minority-influence districts. The plan
for the forty senate districts included two black majority-minority
districts, three hispanic majority-minority districts, and three
black minority-influence districts.
The Attorney General refused to pre-clear the districting
plan for the senate because it failed to create a third black major-
ity-minority district. The Governor, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House all refused to convene another
special legislative session to revise the senate redistricting plan.
The Florida Supreme Court adopted a revised senate redistrict-
ing plan which created a third black majority-minority district by
placing virtually all of the black residents of a four-county area
into the district.'55
The De Grandy and NAACP plaintiffs, together with the
Department of Justice, renewed their challenge to the legislative
districting plans in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Florida." The three-judge panel found that the senate
154. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So. 276
(Fla. 1992).
155. In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 543
(Ha. 1992).
156. The district court panel bifurcated its hearings on the congressional
and legislative districting plans. The parties stipulated that the existing
congressional districting plan was unconstitutional. (Florida's congressional
delegation was increased from nineteen to twenty-three representatives by the
1990 reapportionment.) The court appointed a special master to develop and
recommend a new congressional districting plan. The special master
appointed an independent expert to evaluate the twelve districting proposals
which various parties had submitted to the court. The independent expert
created a new plan, based upon four of the submitted proposals, which
contained two hispanic majority-minority districts, two black majority-minority
districts, and one black minority-influence district. The district court declared
the existing congressional districting plan unconstitutional, and ordered the
19971
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redistricting plan unconstitutionally diluted black and hispanic
voting strength, but nonetheless adopted the redistricting plan as
the remedy for the vote dilution violation because it best accom-
modated the competing interests of black and hispanic voters.
The panel also found that the house redistricting plan unconsti-
tutionally diluted black and hispanic voting strength, and
adopted a modified redistricting plan developed by the De
Grandy plaintiffs which created two additional hispanic majority-
minority districts and one additional black minority-influence
district.1 57
De Grandy, the State of Florida, and the United States
appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which stayed
the judgment of the District Court.' The Supreme Court
found that § 2 required "substantial proportionality" between
minority voting age population and the number of minority dis-
tricts, not "maximization," and reversed the District Court's hold-
ing that the Senate and House legislative redistricting plans
unconstitutionally diluted minority voting strength, thereby sus-
taining the plans adopted by the state legislature. 59
In a majority opinion written by Justice Souter, the Court
explicitly rejected the Justice Department's policy of denying
preclearance to any districting plan that did not maximize the
number of majority-minority districts:
"[R]eading § 2 to define dilution as any failure to maxi-
mize tends to obscure the very object of the statute and to
state to conduct the 1992 and subsequent congressional elections under the
plan developed by the independent expert. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F.
Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992). The state legislature repealed the old
congressional districting plan and took no further steps to create its own
districting plan. In January, 1994, Andrew Johnson, an unsuccessful 1992
congressional candidate for one of the black majority-minority districts, and
several non-black residents of that district filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Florida alleging that the district was a radally
gerrymandered district under Shaw. A new three-judge panel denied their
motion for a preliminary injunction because enjoining the use the district
court's 1992 redistricting plan would have disrupted the 1994 elections. The
new panel found that the previous three-judge panel in De Grandy lacked the
constitutional authority to adopt a permanent congressional redistricting plan,
and that the district constituted a racial gerrymander. Johnson v. Mortham,
915 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla. 1995). The new panel later found that the district
was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, Johnson v.
Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996), and adopted an interim
congressional districting plan devised by the state legislature for the 1996
elections, Johnson v. Mortham, 1996 WL 297280 (N.D. Fla.).
157. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F.Supp. 1550 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
158. Wetherell v. De Grandy, 505 U.S. 1232 (1992).
159. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
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run counter to its textually stated purpose. One may sus-
pect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not
entitled to suspect (much less infer) dilution from mere
failure to guarantee a political feast.... Failure to maxi-
mize cannot be the measure of § 2."16°
The Court also rejected the state's attempt to use proportionality
between the percentage of majority-minority districts and the
percentage of the minority population as a "safe harbor" against
a vote dilution claim: "[A safe harbor rule would] promote and
perpetuate efforts to devise majority-minority districts even in
circumstances where they may not be necessary to achieve equal
political and electoral opportunity."16 Finally, the Court
reminded those involved in designing congressional and legisla-
tive districts of the limited remedial purposes of majority-minor-
ity districts:
If the lesson of Ginges is that society's racial and ethnic
cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts
to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity, that
should not obscure the fact that there are communities in
which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with
voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need
to be a majority within a single district in order to elect
candidates of their choice. Those candidates may not rep-
resent perfection to every minority voter, but minority vot-
ers are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and
trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which
is not to be slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten
the waning of racism in American politics. 6
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor praised the
majority's "carefully crafted approach": "The opinion's central
teaching is that proportionality-defined as the relationship
between the number of majority-minority voting districts and the
minority group's share of the relevant population-is always rele-
vant evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never itself dis-
positive.""6 In another concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
reminded those involved in designing congressional and legisla-
tive districts of the constitutional limits on the remedial use of
majority-minority districts:
Given our decision in Shaw, there is good reason for state
and federal officials with responsibilities related to redis-
160. Id. at 1016-17.
161. Id. at 1019-20.
162. Id. at 1020.
163. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tricting, as well as reviewing courts, to recognize that
explicit race-based districting embarks us on a most dan-
gerous course. It is necessary to bear in mind that redis-
tricting must comply with the overriding demands of the
Equal Protection Clause. 1"
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
argued as he would in Holder v. Hall1 65 that a districting plan is
not a voting "standard, practice, or procedure" under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.11
In De Grandy, the Court addressed the third question about
the use of race-conscious districting: what is the appropriate pro-
portion of race-conscious districts? This question arises in the
aftermath of the two previous case: Growe determined that the
failure to create race-conscious districts could be vote dilution,
and Voinrovich determined that the creation of race-conscious dis-
tricts could also be vote dilution. How many race-conscious dis-
tricts must a state create to avoid vote dilution? The Court
adopted a "substantial proportionality" standard and rejected
both a maximization standard and a proportionality (or safe har-
bor) standard. Justice O'Connor praised the Court's "carefully
crafted approach"-an approach she castigated eight years ear-
lier in Ging&es. Like Holder v. Hall, which was handed down the
same day, De Grandy illustrates the Court's increasing frustration
with its vote dilution jurisprudence, and its inability to develop a
principled standard for determining vote dilution.
10. The Benchmark Problem in Determining Vote Dilution
The Supreme Court acknowledged the limits of its vote dilu-
tion jurisprudence in Holder v. Hal. 6 7 In Holder, several black
registered voters from Bleckley County, Georgia challenged the
county's single-commissioner form of government under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. In Bleckley County (like ten other coun-
ties in Georgia and numerous counties throughout America) a
single commissioner performed all of the legislative and execu-
tive functions of the county government. In 1985, the state legis-
lature had authorized the county to adopt a multi-member
commission form of government, with the chairperson elected at
large and five commissioners elected from single-member dis-
tricts. Four years earlier the county voters had approved a five-
164. Id. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
165. 512 U.S. 874, 891 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (1994).
166. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1033 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
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member districting plan for the election of the county school
board, and the adoption of a similar districting plan for the
county government would have enabled the county to create a
black majority-minority district. But in a 1986 referendum, the
county voters rejected the multi-member commission plan for
the county government.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
found that the respondents had failed to satisfy the second and
third Gingles preconditions." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, found that the
respondents had proved vote dilution, and remanded the case
back to the district court for the formulation of a remedy
modeled after the five-member districting plan for the election
of the county school board.16 9 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, and held that the size of a county commis-
sion could not be subject to a vote dilution claim.
In deciding a vote dilution claim under § 2, the Court must
find a reasonable alternative voting practice to use as a bench-
mark to evaluate the existing voting practice. The respondents
in Holder argued that a five-member commission was an appro-
priate benchmark in the case because the five-member commis-
sion was a common form of county government in Georgia, the
state legislature had authorized Bleckley County to adopt a five-
member commission, and Bleckley County had earlier adopted a
five-member school board. But the Supreme Court concluded,
by a badly fractured five to four majority, that there was no prin-
cipled benchmark for determining the appropriate size of such a
governmental body. Both Justice Kennedy writing for the Court
with ChiefJustice Rehnquist, andJustice O'Connor writing a sep-
arate concurring opinion, argued that the size of a governing
body constituted a "standard, practice, or procedure" under §§ 2
and 5. In a § 5 claim, finding an alternative voting practice to
use as a benchmark is not a problem-the benchmark is the
former voting practice employed by the jurisdiction seek-
ing preclearance for a new voting practice. However, in a § 2
claim, finding a benchmark is "extremely problematic"-"the
wide range of possibilities makes the choice inherently
standardess. 170
Justice Thomas, in a separate concurring opinion joined by
Justice Scalia, argued that the size of a governing body is not a
"standard, practice, or procedure" under § 2, and that a "system-
168. Hall v. Holder, 757 F. Supp. 1560 (M.D. Ca. 1991).
169. Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992).
170. Holder, 512 U.S. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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atic reassessment" of the Court's interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act was required:
A review of the current state of our cases shows that by con-
struing the Act to cover potentially dilutive electoral mech-
anisms, we have immersed the federal courts in the
hopeless project of weighing questions of political the-
ory-questions judges must confront to establish a bench-
mark concept of an "undiluted" vote. Worse, in pursuing
the ideal measure of voting strength, we have devised a
remedial mechanism that encourages federal courts to seg-
regate voters into racially designated districts to ensure
minority electoral success. In doing so, we have collabo-
rated in what may aptly be termed the racial
"balkaniz[ation]" of the Nation.
I can no longer adhere to a reading of the Act that
does not comport with the terms of the statute and that has
produced such a disastrous misadventure in judicial poli-
cymaking. I would hold that the size of a government body
is not a "standard, practice, or procedure" because, prop-
erly understood, those terms reach only state enactments
that limit a citizen's access to the ballot. 171
Justices Thomas and Scalia would read the Voting Rights Act in
light of its original purpose of providing access to registration
and voting, and would abandon the Court's entire vote dilution
jurisprudence because there is no judicially manageable standard
for determining the 'weight' of an undiluted vote.
C. onclusion
In the introduction to this section, I indicated that there
have been three different attempts since the 1960s to prevent
racial discrimination in voting. Each of these attempts employed
a procedural device-a rebuttable presumption with a shift in
the burden of production-to establish a conclusion of racial dis-
crimination from purported evidence of racially disproportion-
ate results (not racially discriminatory purpose). This purported
evidence of racially disproportionate results was produced by
using certain standards to determine what racially proportionate
results would be.
In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Congress determined
that black citizens were denied the opportunity to register and
vote when states or localities used a voting test or device that
171. Id. at 892-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
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resulted in less than fifty percent of the eligible black citizens
registering or voting in a presidential election. In the context of
the times, it was clear that many voting tests and devices had a
racially disproportionate impact, and it was reasonable to pre-
sume that states and localities maintained such tests and devices
for racially discriminatory purposes. Thanks in large part to the
success of the Voting Rights Act and other civil rights measures,
it would not be reasonable to presume such a purpose today. For
example, the low voter turnout rates in majority-minority districts
cannot readily be traced to discriminatory voting tests or
devices-unless the majority-minority districts themselves are dis-
criminatory voting devices!
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court determined that citi-
zens were denied the opportunity to cast an "undiluted" vote
when they were assigned to voting districts that were not substan-
tially equal in population. This standard was originally designed
to detect the disparity between rural districts and urban or subur-
ban districts, not the disparity between white voters and minority
voters. Although this standard may provide evidence from which
the presumption of an "injury" may properly be drawn, the text
of the Constitution does not recognize such an "injury" and does
not authorize the Court to devise a remedy. Nevertheless, this
standard has been used to transform how states and localities
elect their public officials, and has called into question the
Court's authority and competence to affect such a
transformation.
Finally, in Thonbuig v. Ging&e, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that minority groups were denied the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the political process when the preferred candidates of
sufficiently large, geographically compact, and politically cohe-
sive minority groups were usually defeated by purported racial
bloc-voting by the white majority. Lack of electoral success
became evidence of racial discrimination, and race-conscious dis-
tricts were soon designed to ensure the electoral success of cer-
tain minority groups.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAcIAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIM
A. Introduction.
In Shaw v. Reno,]  the Supreme Court addressed the final
question from Thornburg v. Ging/i: whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment placed any constitutional
limits on the creation of race-conscious districts. The case called
172. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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into question the three decades of vote dilution jurisprudence
which had transformed the way we elect our federal, state, and
local officials and had culminated in the creation of majority-
minority districts. The Court distinguished its earlier decision in
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey'73 which had appeared to
repudiate the racial gerrymandering claim, and brought the use
of race-conscious districts within the confines of its emerging
Equal Protection jurisprudence. 74
B. Analysis
1. The Origins of the Racial Gerrymandering Claim
The racial gerrymandering claim was first articulated in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot.75 In Gomillion, black residents of Tuskegee,
Alabama alleged that the state legislature had redrawn the
municipal boundaries of the city to deprive black voters of the
opportunity to vote in municipal elections. The state legislature
had transformed the shape of the municipal boundaries from a
square to a strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure which
placed all but four or five of the city's 400 black residents outside
the city's boundaries. The district court dismissed the residents'
suit because they had failed to state a claim upon which the court
could grant relief, 76 and the court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's judgment 177 The Supreme Court reversed the dis-
trict court's judgment, and remanded the residents' claim back
to the district court." The Supreme Court held that the Fif-
teenth Amendment limits a state legislature's authority to draw
municipal election districts.
When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated seg-
ment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treat-
ment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment. In no case
involving unequal weight in voting distribution that has
come before the Court did the decision sanction a differ-
entiation on racial lines whereby approval was given to
unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citi-
zens. Apart from all else, these considerations lift this con-
173. 430 U.S. 144 (1977)
174. See Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
175. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
176. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
177. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
178. GomiUon, 364 U.S. at 348.
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troversy out of the so-called "political" arena and into the
conventional sphere of constitutional litigation.
1 79
In a concurring opinion, Justice Whitaker argued that the
Court's opinion should have been based upon the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifteenth
Amendment' 80
Gomilion embodies the tension between the Court's vote
dilution jurisprudence and racial gerrymandering jurisprudence.
It clearly anticipates the type of vote dilution claim the Court
would soon develop under the Equal Protection Clause. At this
point, however, the Court was unwilling to hurdle the obstacle
posed by the political question doctrine. Instead, the Court
chose to base its decision on the Fifteenth Amendment because
the manner in which the state had redrawn the municipal
boundaries of Tuskegee had denied blacks the opportunity to
vote in municipal elections, and not merely diluted the weight of
their votes. It is important to notice, however, that the Court
used the way the municipal boundaries were drawn as indirect
evidence of the state's racially discriminatory purpose-rejecting
the discriminatory effects test upon which the Court would base
its vote dilution jurisprudence, and establishing the racial gerry-
mandering claim to which the Court would return in Shaw.
The use of a permissive inference device for proving racial
gerrymandering was first articulated in Wright v. Rockefeller.'8 ' In
Wright, several registered voters of the four congressional districts
encompassing the borough of Manhattan alleged that a congres-
sional districting plan intentionally segregated white voters into
one district, and black and Puerto Rican voters into another dis-
trict (represented by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.) in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.18 2 Two members of the
three-judge panel of the district court found that the voters had
failed to prove that the legislature was motivated by a racially dis-
179. Id. at 346-47.
180. Id. at 349 (Whitaker, J., concurring).
181. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
182. Counsel for the appellants explained that this was
"a case of ghettoizing the Island of Manhattan" so as "to create a white
Congressional district and a non-white Congressional district." "I
think," counsel said, "the only province of the Court in this area is to
determine whether or not these districts have been created with racial
considerations in mind, and, if they have, or if the results of this
districting, the effect of the statute is to create racially segregated
areas, we maintain that it violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments."
Id. at 54.
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criminatory purpose, and dismissed their claim. s1 8  A dissenting
member of the panel argued that the voters had presented evi-
dence sufficient to establish "per se a pima facia case of a legisla-
tive intent to draw congressional district lines ... on the basis of
race and national origin." "'
The Supreme Court accepted the findings of the majority of
the district court panel that the voters had failed to prove that
the legislature was "either motivated by racial considerations or
in fact drew the districts on racial lines," "a and affirmed the dis-
trict court's judgment to dismiss the voters' claim. The Court
noted that the parties were divided over the issue of whether
minority voters should be concentrated into a single district or
dispersed among the four districts."a The Court contrasted the
case with the Fifteenth Amendment claim in Gomillion (where
the districting scheme deprived minority voters of the opportu-
nity to vote in municipal elections) and the newly-created Four-
teenth Amendment vote dilution claim in Wesberry v.
Sander "(where the districting scheme failed to create districts
based as nearly as practicable on equal population).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas found that the vot-
ers had presented unrebutted evidence that the state had drawn
districts along racial lines."a Justice Douglas objected to the
state's segregation of voters into separate districts, and noted that
the state supported this segregation on a theory of "separate but
better off' which had been used by attorneys for the defendant
states in Brown v. Board of Education." 9 "The fact that Negro
political leaders find advantage in this nearly solid Negro and
Puerto Rican district is irrelevant to our problem. Rotten bor-
oughs were long a curse of democratic processes. Racial bor-
oughs are also at war with democratic standards.""9
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Goldberg found that
the voters had presented evidence concerning the shape of the
district sufficient to create the inference that the state had drawn
districts along racial lines:
What more need the appellants have proved? ... [B]y
their evidence [the appellants] established a pattern of seg-
regation not adequately explained on a geometric, geo-
183. Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460 (1962).
184. Id. at 472-73.
185. Wrigt 376 U.S. at 56.
186. Id. at 57-58.
187. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
188. Id at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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graphic, [population] equalization, party-compromise,
neighborhood or other basis. To require a showing of
racial motivation in the legislature would place an impossi-
ble burden on the [appellants].... No public hearings
were had on the [districting] bill and no statements by the
bill's managers or published debates were available.
Under these circumstances, appellants' evidence, showing
the factual pattern of segregation . .. ,was sufficient to
establish a prima facia case of unconstitutional racial dis-
tricting. Once this had been done, appellees should have
introduced evidence negating the inference that racial seg-
regation was a purpose of the districting. In the absence of
such proof by the State, [the finder of fact was] compelled
to conclude that racial segregation was a criterion in-or a
purpose of-the districting .... "
This permissive inference device would form the basis of the
racial gerrymandering claim outlined a generation later in Shaw.
2. The Apparent Repudiation of the Racial Gerrymandering
Claim
The Supreme Court appeared to repudiate the racial gerry-
mandering claim in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO). M
In uJO, the New York state legislature redesigned its state legisla-
tive districts to create several majority-minority districts and
thereby gain preclearance for its plan from the Justice Depart-
ment. 93 Under the previous legislative districting plan, a 30,000
member Hasidic Jewish community was located entirely within a
single legislative district with a 61% non-white population. To
increase the non-white population to 65%, a portion of the
191. Id. at 73-74 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
192. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
193. States and localities covered by the special provisions of the Voting
Rights Act must gain predearance from the Attorney General or a three-judge
panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for any new voting
practice, including a new districting plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). In these
proceedings, the state or locality has the burden of proving that the new voting
practice "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote" on account of race, color, or national origin. Id.
To prove that the new voting practice does not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or national origin, the
state or locality must establish that the new voting practice does not "lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141(1976). The state may meet this burden of proof, and gain preclearance for its
districting plan, by demonstrating that the plan increases the number of
majority-minority districts. Id.
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Hasidic community was placed in a separate district The Attor-
ney General precleared the new districting plan.
United Jewish Organizations (U.J.O.) filed suit on behalf of
the members of the Hasidic community, alleging that the plan
diluted the weight of the community members' votes in order to
achieve a racial quota in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."M U.J.O. also alleged that the members of the community
were assigned to voting districts solely on the basis of race which
diluted the weight of their votes in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 9 ' UJ.O. sought an injunction to prevent the state
from conducting elections under the new districting plan, and a
declaratory judgment that the Justice Department had used an
improper and unconstitutional standard to preclear the plan.' 96
The district court found that the members of the Hasidic
community did not have a constitutional right to recognition as a
separate community and dismissed their suit.197 The court held
that racial factors could be used to remedy past racial discrimina-
tion, and that the districting plan did not disenfranchise the
Hasidic voters.'98 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the suit.' 9 The court of appeals held that it
did not have the jurisdiction to review the Justice Department's
preclearance decisions. 00 The court also held that the Hasidic
voters did not suffer a vote dilution under the standards devel-
oped by the Supreme Court."° '
A deeply divided Supreme Court also affirmed the dismissal
of the suit.202 A four-member plurality (consisting of Justices
White, Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun) found that states may
194. Id. at 152.
195. Id. at 152-53.
196. Id. at 153.
197. United Jewish Organizations v. Wilson, 377 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
198. Id. at 1166.
199. UnitedJewish Organizations v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
200. Id. at 520.
201. Id. at 523. For the vote dilution standards developed by the
Supreme Court, see the discussion in Sec. IV.B.3 supra.
202. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (White,
J., plurality opinion). Seven members of the Court voted to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the suit. Justices White and Stevens were joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun to sustain the districting plan under the Voting Rights
Act. Id. at 155-162. Justices White and Stevens were also joined by Justice
Rehnquist to sustain the districting plan under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Id. at 162-68. Justices Stewart and Powell concurred in the
judgment and concluded that the districting plan did not have the purpose or
effect of discriminating against the petitioners on the basis of their race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 179-181. Chief Justice Burger
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create majority-minority districts to comply with § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act:
[T]he Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the
Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving
black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure
that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5.... Sec-
tion 5 and its authorization for racial redistricting where
appropriate to avoid abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color are constitutional.... [N] either the Four-
teenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se
rule against using racial factors in districting and appor-
tionment.... The permissible use of racial criteria is not
confined to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory
districting or apportionment. 203
This plurality held that states may use racial criteria, including
racial quotas,2 °4 to design voting districts, and that the use of
racial criteria to design voting districts is not limited to the pur-
pose of remedying the present effects of past discrimination. °5
A three-member plurality (consisting of Justices White, Ste-
vens, and Rehnquist) found that the use of racial criteria to
design voting districts did not present the type of invidious racial
discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments:
There is no doubt that in [designing the legislative dis-
tricts] the State deliberately used race in a purposeful man-
ner. But its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with
respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no dis-
crimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment nor
any abridgment of the right to vote on account of race
within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. °6
This plurality held that states may create majority-minority dis-
tricts which respect traditional districting principles such as
equal population and compactness. °7 Two other members of
the Court (Justices Stewart and Powell) argued that the state did
not act with a racially discriminatory purpose because it acted in
response to a position taken by the Justice Department under the
dissented. Id. at 180-187. Justice Marshall did not participate in the
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 168.
203. UJO, 430 U.S. at 161.
204. See id. at 162 ("[A] reapportionment cannot violate the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific numerical quotas
in establishing a certain number of black majority districts.").
205. Id. at 161.
206. Id. at 165.
207. Id. at 168.
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Voting Rights Act 20 8 These members declined to consider
whether the position taken by the Justice Department was
authorized or required by the Voting Rights Act
2 °9
One member of the plurality (Justice Brennan) argued that
the participation of the Justice Department through the
preclearance mechanism of the Voting Rights Act helped to
ensure that the state did not use racial criteria for an invidious
purpose, and "largely relieve[d]" the Court of the responsibility
for distinguishing benign from invidious purposes. 10 "[T]he
application of the Voting Rights Act substantially minimizes the
objections to preferential treatment, and legitimates the use of
even overt, numerical racial devices in electoral redistricting."21 1
Although he was aware that the use of racial criteria for allegedly
benign purposes "raise[d] particularly sensitive issues of doctrine
and policy,"212 and troubled that racial criteria were used in this
case to burden a group peculiarly vulnerable to racial discrimina-
tion,21 3Justice Brennan had no doubt that the Hasidic voters did
not suffer invidious racial discrimination:
[T]he obvious remedial nature of the Act and its enact-
ment by an elected Congress that hardly can be viewed as
dominated by non-white representatives belie the possibil-
ity that the decisionmaker intended a racial insult or injury
to those whites who are adversely affected by the operation
of the Act's provisions.21 4
The lone dissenting member of the Court, ChiefJustice Bur-
ger, would later be vindicated by the majority in Shaw:
Manipulating the racial composition of electoral districts
to assure one minority or another its "deserved" represen-
tation will not promote the goal of a racially neutral legisla-
ture. On the contrary, such racial gerrymandering puts
the imprimatur of the State on the concept that race is a
proper consideration in the electoral process....
The result reached by the Court today in the name of
the Voting Rights Act is ironic. The use of [majority-
minority districts] tends to sustain the existence of ghettos
by promoting the notion that political clout is to be gained
or maintained by marshaling particular racial, ethnic, or
208. Id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
209. Id. at 180 n.
210. Id. at 175 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 178.
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religious groups in enclaves. It suggests to the voter that
only a candidate of the same race, religion, or ethnic ori-
gin can properly represent that voter's interests, and that
such a candidate can be elected only from a district with a
215sufficient minority concentration.
The Court in UJO drew a distinction between "malignant"
discrimination that sought to stigmatize members of particular
racial or ethnic groups, and "benign" discrimination that sought
to help particular racial or ethnic groups overcome the effects of
malignant discrimination. "Benign" discrimination would not be
subject to strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause.216 Racial criteria, including racial quotas, could be used
to design voting districts, and their use would not be limited to
ameliorating previous vote dilution. Race-conscious districts
could be created simply to give racial and ethnic minorities a bet-
ter opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
the representatives of their choice. A plurality of the Court
sought to use traditional districting principles as a restriction
upon the creation of race-conscious districts, but the Justice
Department which administered the creation of race-conscious
districts under the Voting Rights Act did not recognize such a
restriction. After the reapportionment of congressional districts
following the 1990 decennial census, the Court would be forced
to revisit its handiwork.
3. The Re-establishment of the Racial Gerrymandering Claim
The Supreme Court resurrected the racial gerrymandering
claim in Shaw v. RenoM 2 17 to undo the damage its vote dilution
jurisprudence, including its decision in UJO, had caused. North
Carolina's congressional delegation was increased from eleven to
twelve representatives as a result of the round of apportionment
following the 1990 decennial census.218 In July, 1991, the state
legislature enacted a congressional districting plan which con-
tained one black majority-minority district.2 1 9 Because the state
is subject to the special provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
the state submitted the plan to the Attorney General for pre-
clearance. 220 The Attorney General refused to pre-clear the
state's plan because it failed to create a second black majority-
215. Id. at 186 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
216. See also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
217. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
218. Id. at 633.
219. Id. at 633, 634.
220. Id.
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minority district in the south-central to south-eastern counties of
the state.221
In response to the Attorney General's objection to the pro-
posed congressional districting plan, the state legislature enacted
a second plan in January, 1992.' The new plan contained two
black majority-minority districts. (See Appendix A.) The second
majority-minority district was an unusually shaped district that
stretched 160 miles from Durham to Gastonia along 1-85 with
extensions into the historic black sections of the five major cities
which it connected. Of the ten different counties through which
the district passed, five counties were cut into three different dis-
tricts. The district was often no wider than the lanes of 1-85
whose course it followed. Northbound and southbound drivers
on 1-85 could find themselves in separate districts in one county,
only to switch districts when they entered the next county. At
one point the district remained contiguous only because it inter-
sected at a single point with two other districts before crossing
over them.2 The Attorney General pre-cleared this revised
plan.22 4
Several white registered voters challenged the congressional
districting plan as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.'
They alleged that the two majority-minority districts concen-
trated black voters without regard for compactness, contiguity,
geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions, and for the
sole purpose of creating districts along racial lines to ensure the
election of two black representatives to Congress. A three-judge
panel of district court dismissed the voters' suit for failing to state
a claim upon which the court could grant relief.226
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back
to the district court for consideration of the voters' claim." 7 The
Court held that
a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under
the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging
that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, ration-
221. Id. at 633, 635.
222. Id. at 633.
223. Id. at 635-36.
224. Id. at 636.
225. In a separate action, the North Carolina Republican Party and
individual voters alleged that the congressional districting plan was an
unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandmer. The district
court dismissed the daim. SeePope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992),
aff'd 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
226. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
227. Id. at 658.
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ally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort
to separate voters into different districts on the basis
of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.22 s
The Court relied upon Justice Whitaker's concurrence in Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot"for the proposition that the segregation of citi-
zens into different voting districts on the basis of race, regardless
of the motivation for the segregation, requires careful judicial
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court stated that a racial gerrymandering
claim was "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution claim,2 0 and
was not foreclosed by the Court's decision in UJO.2 1
The Court also relied upon Wright v. Rockefeller to illustrate
the difficulty of determining from the face of a districting plan
that "it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of
race."23 F Examining the districting plan for unlawful discrimina-
tory purposes poses unique problems for a reviewing court
because "the legislature is always aware of race when it draws dis-
trict lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic fac-
tors."2 11 "That sort of race consciousness," the Court observed,
"does not lead to impermissible race discrimination. "234 To dis-
tinguish between mere awareness of race and the discriminatory
use of racial criteria, the Court suggested that reviewing courts
should determine whether the districting plan observed tradi-
tional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions. Traditional districting princi-
ples are important "not because they are constitutionally
required-they are not-but because they are objective factors
that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerry-
mandered on racial lines."2 35 As later cases would make clear,
states may create majority-minority districts which conform to
traditional districting principles without being subjected to strict
scrutiny. 3 6
228. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649.
229. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
230. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652.
231. Id. at 651.
232. Id. at 646.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
236. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw II] and Bush
v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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5. The Refinement of the Elements of the Racial
Gerrymandering Claim
The elements of a racial gerrymandering claim have been
articulated in a series of cases decided after Shaw.2"7 I discuss
these elements more thoroughly in the two subsections below,
but the structure of the claim is as follows: The plaintiffs have
the burden of proving that voters were assigned to voting districts
on the basis of race. The plaintiffs must prove that race was the
predominant factor in assigning voters to voting districts, and
that traditional districting principles were subordinated to racial
considerations in assigning voters to voting districts. To prove
that race was the predominant factor, plaintiffs may use either
direct evidence of legislative purpose or circumstancial evidence
of a district's shape and demographic characteristics. If the
plaintiffi demonstrate that voters were assigned to voting districts
on the basis of race, they have met their burden of proving their
prima facia case and have established a racial gerrymander. The
burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to provide an
affirmative defense-that the racially-gerrymandered district is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Compli-
ance with the vote dilution provision of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act may be the only compelling state interest which can survive
strict scrutiny. Any race-conscious district created to avoid vote
dilution under § 2 must remedy the vote dilution and must also
respect traditional districting principles.
a. The Plaintiffs Pima Facia Case
In a racial gerrymandering case, the plaintiffs must demon-
strate that voters have been assigned to voting districts on the
basis of race. Plaintiffs typically allege racial gerrymandering in
one of two situations: (1) a new districting plan creates more
majority-minority districts than the prior districting plan, and
direct evidence indicates that the legislature created the addi-
tional majority-minority districts in response to a private suit
under the Voting Rights Act or a denial of preclearance by the
Justice Department under § 5; or (2) a new districting plan cre-
ates districts in which members of a particular racial group are
concentrated in numbers disproportionate to their representa-
tion in the state's population as a whole, and the shape of the
districts is so highly irregular that this circumstantial evidence
237. See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Miller v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116
S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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may give rise to an inference that the legislature deliberately
attempted to achieve such a disproportionate concentration.2ss
As the Court noted in Shaw v. Reno, it may be difficult for
plaintiffs to demonstrate that voters have been assigned to voting
districts on the basis of race because the legislature is always
aware of race when it designs voting districts, but the mere aware-
ness of race does not constitute impermissible racial discrimina-
tion.23 9 The Court therefore devised the following standard for
238. Id. The congressional districting plans of North Carolina, Louisiana
and Georgia were developed in circumstances similar to the first situation. See
Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D.
La. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994); and Johnson v. Miller,
864 F. Supp. (S.D. Ga. 1994), affd and remande4 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). The
congressional districting plans of California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, Virginia,
and New York were developed in circumstances similar to the second situation.
See DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), affd in part and reo'd in
par, 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex.
1994), affd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); De Grandy v.
Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992) andJohnson v. Mortham, 915 F.
Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla 1995); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634
(N.D. 1. 1991), a f/d sub nom. King v. State Bd. of Elections, 1996 WL 130439
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1996), rev'd and remanded 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996); Moon v.
Meadows, 1997 WL 57432 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 1997) aff'd 1997 WL 274775 (U.S.
Va.); Diaz v. Silver, 1997 WL 94175 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997).
239. The problem of distinguishing between awareness of race in the
design of voting districts and assigning voters to voting districts on the basis of
race has several dimensions. First, the problem makes it difficult for the
plaintiffs to establish standing to sue. It is often impossible to ascertain why a
particular voter was placed in a particular district. The Court, therefore, has
adopted a test for determining standing that depends upon the district in which
the plaintiff resides:
Where a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district,... the
plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's
reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the
legislature's action .... Voters in such districts may suffer the special
representational harms racial classifications can cause in the voting
context. On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a
district, he or she does not suffer those special harms, and any
inference that the plaintiff has personally been subjected to the racial
classification would not bejustified absent specific evidence tending to
support that inference. Unless such evidence is present, that plaintiff
would be asserting only a generalized grievance against governmental
conduct of which he or she does not approve.
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1995). If the plaintiff lives in the
district which he alleges is a racially-gerrymandered district, he automatically
has standing to challenge the plan which created the district because he has
been the victim of an alleged racial classification. If the plaintiff does not live in
the district which he alleges is a racially-gerrymandered district, he does not
have standing to challenge the plan which created the district unless he can
demonstrate with specific evidence that he was assigned to his district on the
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proving that voters have been assigned to voting districts on the
basis of race:
The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circum-
stantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or
more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race
was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district. To make this showing, a plain-
basis of his race, and therefore has been the victim of an alleged racial
classification.
Second, the problem makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prove racial gerry-
mandering. As I discuss below, see text accompanying fn. 241 infra, the Court
has adopted the standard that plaintiffs must prove that race was the predomi-
nant factor in assigning voters to voting districts, and that traditional districting
principles were subordinated to racial considerations. Miller v.Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995).
Finally, the problem implicates the constitutional question of whether all
race-conscious districting is subject to strict scrutiny. The Court expressly
declined to address this question in Shaw v. Renw. "[W]e express no view as to
whether 'the intentional creation of a majority-minority districts, without more'
always gives rise to an equal protection claim." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649
(1993). Since then, Justice O'Connor has indicated that some race-conscious
districting is not subject to strict scrutiny: "Strict scrutiny does not apply merely
because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. See Shaw v. Reno
.... Nor does it apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority minority
districts. See DeW'tt v. Wilson. ... " Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996)
(citations omitted). Justice Thomas has indicated that all race-conscious dis-
tricting is subject to strict scrutiny:
We have said that impermissible racial classifications do not fol-
low inevitably from a legislature's mere awareness of racial
demographics.... But the intentional creation of a majority-minority
district certainly means more than mere awareness that the applica-
tion of traditional, race-neutral districting principles will result in the
creation of a district in which a majority of the district's residents are
members of a particular minority group.... In my view, it means that
the legislature affirmatively undertakes to create a majority-minority
district that would not have existed but for the express use of racial
classifications-in other words, that a majority-minority district is
created "because of," and not merely "in spite of," racial
demographics.... When that occurs, traditional race-neutral district-
ing principles are necessarily subordinated (and race necessarily pre-
dominates), and the legislature has classified persons on the basis of
race. The resulting redistricting must be viewed as a racial
gerrymander.
Id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion to distinguish himself from
Justice O'Connor position and reserve the question: "I do not consider these
dicta to commit me to any position on the question whether race is predomi-
nant whenever a State, in redistricting, foreordains that one race be the major-
ity in a certain number of districts or in a certain part of the State. Id. at 1971
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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tiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles, including but not lim-
ited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdi-
visions or communities defined by actual shared interests,
to racial considerations.
2 40
This standard has a number of significant components. First
and foremost, unlike a vote dilution claim, the plaintiffs must
prove that the districting plan had a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, and not simply a racially disproportionate result. Second,
the plaintiffs must prove that race was the predominant factor
motivating the design of the districts, and not simply one factor
or the only factor.
Third, in order to prove that race was the predominant fac-
tor, the plaintiffs must prove that traditional districting princi-
ples were subordinated to racial considerations. If the design of
the district was subordinated to other considerations but not to
racial considerations, then the district may be a political gerry-
mander but it is not a racial gerrymander. Political gerrymander-
ing is not subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 42 If the design of the
district merely correlates with race but is not subordinated to
racial considerations, then the district is not a racial gerryman-
der. 43 If race is used as a proxy for political affiliation in the
design of the district, however, the district is a racial
gerrymander.
244
240. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995).
241. In Bush v. Vera, 116 S. CL 1941, the Court held that incumbency
protection was a factor in the design of the challenged districts, but both the
protection of incumbents and traditional districting principles were
subordinated to racial considerations. Compare Vera ("We thus differ from
Justice Thomas, who would apparently hold that it suffices that racial
considerations be a motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district."
Id. at 1952 (emphasis added)) with DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D.
Cal. 1994), summarily affid in part and dism'd in par4 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995)
("[The Special] Masters did not redistrict based solely on race, but showed
depth and insight in considering race as a component of traditional districting
principles." Id. at 1415 (emphasis added)).
242. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1954 (noting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986)).
243. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 ("If district lines merely correlate with
race because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation, which correlates
with race, there is no racial classification to justify, just as racial disproportions
in the level of prosecutions for a particular crime may be unobjectionable if
they merely reflect racial disproportions in the commission of that crime .... "
(referring to United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)). See also
Brown, supra note 56.
244. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 ("[T]o the extent that race is used as a
proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is
in operation." (referring to Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) ("Race cannot
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Fourth, the plaintiffs may prove that traditional districting
principles were subordinated to racial considerations, either by
presenting direct evidence of legislative purpose, or circumstan-
tial evidence of a district's shape and demographic factors.
Direct evidence would include reports by special masters
appointed to develop districting plans, committee reports and
legislative debates, documents submitted to the Justice Depart-
ment to obtain preclearance, and concessions made during liti-
gation. During the 1990 cycle of redistricting, there was ample
direct evidence available for plaintiffs to prove that traditional
districting principles were subordinated to racial considera-
tions.24 The shape of a district is circumstantial evidence that
may give rise to an inference that traditional districting princi-
ples were subordinated to race:
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary ele-
ment of the constitutional wrong or a threshold require-
ment of proof, but because it may be persuasive
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not
other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant
and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.2 46
This is consistent with Gomil/ion where the shape of the ci
annexation was circumstantial evidence of legislative purpose.
This is slightly different from Justice Goldberg's dissent in Wright
because the evidence of the district's shape must be used to
prove purpose, not result, and must prove predominant motive,
248not mere motive.
Fifth, the districting plan must involve the assignment of a
"significant number" of voters to districts on the basis of race.
Finally, the districting plan must involve the inclusion of voters
into, or the exclusion of voters from, a particular district on the
basis of race. This component would cover the group of Hasidic
voters in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey who were divided
from other Hasidic voters and placed in a separate district to pre-
be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence.")). But see Vera, 116 S. Ct.
at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and 2001 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also
Geoffrey Cockerell, Batson Reform" A Lottery System of Affirmative Selection, 11
NoTRE DA~m J.L. ETmIcs & PuB. POLY 363 (1997).
245. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489; Shaw fI, 116S. Ct. at 1901; and Vera, 116
S. Ct. at 1952, 1953, 1956-57, 1974.
246. MiUer, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
247. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). For the discussion of
this case, see Sec. V.B.1 supra.
248. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). For the discussion of this
case, see Sec. V.B.1 supra.
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serve a 65% minority voter population quota in the other
district.2 14 9
b. The Defendant's Rebuttal
Once the plaintiffs have proven their prima facia case of
racial gerrymandering (i.e., that race was the predominant factor
in assigning voters to voting districts, and that traditional district-
ing principles were subordinated to racial considerations in
designing the voting districts), the burden then shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence that the race-conscious districts
were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest. 0 States have offered four compelling governmental
interests to justify the creation of race-conscious districts: (1)
compliance with the preclearance objections of the Justice
Department pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) compli-
ance with the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act; (3) compliance with the vote dilution provisions of § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act; and (4) amelioration of the effects of racial
discrimination under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
At the heart of the preclearance objections of the Justice
Department is an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act
through which the Department used its preclearance authority to
compel states to adopt race-conscious districting plans and maxi-
mize the number of majority-minority districts at the expense of
traditional districting principles. The Justice Department has
interpreted the amendment of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
1982 as incorporating a vote dilution requirement or "results
test" into the "effects" prong of § 5:
In those instances in which the Attorney General con-
cludes that, as proposed, the submitted change is free of
discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect, but also
concludes that a bar to implementation of the change is
necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section
249. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). For a
discussion of this case see Sec. V.B.2 supra.
250. The Supreme Court has not explicitly decided the question whether
the burden of production or persuasion shifts to the defendant. But the three-judge panels that decided the cases that were appealed to the Supreme Court
in Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera both determined that the burden of
production shifted to the defendant. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 436
(E.D.N.C. 1994) rev'd and remanded 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw l]
and Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1336-37 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affid sub no.
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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2, the Attorney General shall withhold a section 5
preclearance.25'
The consequence of this interpretation is to shift from the plain-
tiffs to the defendant the burden of proving that any change in a
state's voting practices, including a new districting plan, does not
result in a dilution of minority voting strength. The Justice
Department also adopted the position that a failure to maximize
the number of majority-minority districts constituted a vote
dilution.
The Supreme Court has repudiated the position of the plu-
rality in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 2 and held that fed-
eral courts need not defer to the Justice Department's
conclusion that the creation of race-conscious districts is
required under the Voting Rights Act:
Where a State relies on the Department's determination
that race-based districting is necessary to comply with the
Voting Rights Act, the judiciary retains an independent
obligation in adjudicating subsequent equal protection
challenges to ensure that the State's actions are narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest.... Were we to
accept the Justice Department's objection itself as a com-
pelling interest adequate to insulate racial districting from
constitutional review, we would be surrendering to the
Executive Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional
limits on race-based official action.25 3
When the Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act compels states to adopt race-conscious districting, a
significant constitutional question is raised and the federal courts
need not defer to the Department's interpretation of the Act.2 1
The Supreme Court has also found that the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of the scope of its preclearance authority is
"insupportable. " 5 The Court has held that the vote dilution
provision of § 2 does not require states to maximize the number
of majority-minority districts at the expense of traditional district-
ing principles,2 ' and therefore the retrogression provision of § 5
does not require maximization either. In using § 5 to compel
states to create majority-minority districts wherever possible, the
251. 28 C.F.R § 51.55(b)(2) (1994). For the relevant provisions of the
Voting Rights Act as amended, see text accompanying fn. 120 supra.
252. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
253. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 2491-92.
255. Id. at 2492.
256. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994).
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Justice Department "expanded its authority under the statute
beyond what Congress intended," and brought the Act into ten-
sion with the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 7 The Court has rejected
the Justice Department's interpretation of §§ 2 and 5, and
avoided the constitutional problems such an interpretation
raised, including whether § 2 is itself constitutional.25 8
The Supreme Court has determined that compliance with
the retrogression provision of § 5, properly interpreted, is a com-
pelling governmental interest. But the Court has cautioned that
the states may not use § 5 as a license to do whatever they deem
"necessary to insure continued electoral success" for minority
groups.259 "A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tai-
lored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the state went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression.
The Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality
of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.2 61 The Court, therefore, has
assumed arguendo that compliance with the vote dilution provi-
sion of § 2 could be a compelling governmental interest.262
However, any race-conscious district created to avoid vote dilu-
tion under § 2 "must, at a minimum, remedy the anticipated vio-
257. Id.; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493.
258. Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1904. Although time consuming and
expensive, the states may by-pass the Justice Department and seek a declaratory
judgment from a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia declaring that the state's new voting practice, including a new
redistricting plan, does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia has consistently rejected the Justice Department's effort to
incorporate a § 2 a vote dilution requirement into the "effects" prong of § 5.
See, e.g., Boosier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434, 440-45 (D.D.C.
1995), vacated 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); Texas v. United States, 1995 WL 769160
(D.D.C. July 10, 1995); Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal
dism'd 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996) (mem.); Georgia v. Reno, 881 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1995), affd 116 S. Ct. 663 (1995) (mem.); and New York v. United States, 874 F.
Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1994), motion to reconsider denied 880 F. Supp. 37 (D.D.C.
1995).
259. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963.
260. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655; Shaw , 116 S. Ct. at 1904.
261. "In the 14 years since the enactment of § 2(b), we have interpreted
and enforced the obligations that it places on States in a succession of cases
[including Thornburg v. Ginges, Growe v. Emison, Voinovich v. Quilter, Johnson v. De
Grandy, and Holder v. Hall ], assuming but never directly addressing its
constitutionality." Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor argues that it would be irresponsible for a state to disregard the vote
dilution provision of § 2, and therefore the Court should allow states to assume
its constitutionality. Id. at 1969.
262. Shaw /, 116 S. Ct. at 1905;Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960.
1997]
292 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY '(VoL 11
lation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored."263 The
state must have a "strong basis in evidence" for assuming that the
minority group is sufficiently large, geographically compact, and
politically cohesive to constitute a majority in a single member
district, and that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it usually to defeat the minority group's preferred
candidate.26
In most of the districts challenged by racial gerrymandering
suits, the minority population was too dispersed to support a geo-
graphically compact district, and therefore the district was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling governmental inter-
est of complying with the vote dilution provision of § 2:
These characteristics defeat any claim that the districts
are narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in avoid-
ing liability under § 2, because § 2 does not require a State
to create, on predominantly racial lines, a district that is
not "reasonably compact." ... If, because of the dispersion
of the minority population, a reasonably compact district
cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority
district; if a reasonably compact district can be created,
nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of a district
that is far from compact.21
A state may not create a majority-minority district just anywhere
in the state. The remedy must "substantially address" the injury:
if the minority group is not sufficiently geographically compact
to support the creation of a majority-minority district using tradi-
tional districting principles, then it hasn't suffered a vote dilution
under § 2; if it is sufficiently geographically compact, then the
creation of a majority-minority district elsewhere in the state
doesn't remedy the vote dilution injury. "To accept that the dis-
trict may be placed anywhere implies the claim, and hence the
coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast an equal ballot
equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not
to its individual members. It does not."2 6 Even if vote dilution is
proven, minority voters do not have a right to be placed in a
majority-minority district.267 A state may not sacrifice traditional
263. Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1905-06.
264. Thornburg v. Gingles, 470 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
265. Vera, 116S. Ct. at 1961 (citations omitted). SeealsoShawfl 116S. Ct.
at 1905.
266. Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1906.
267. Id. at 1906 n.9.
districting princiles, such as geographical compactness, to racial
considerations.'
Finally, the Supreme Court has said that a state may have an
interest in ameliorating the effects of past or present discrimina-
tion, but for that interest to rise to the level of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest it must satisfy two conditions. First, the
discrimination the state seeks to ameliorate must be identified
with some specificity before the race-conscious remedy is
employed.269 A generalized assertion of societal discrimination is
not adequate because it "provides no guidance for a legislative
body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to rem-
edy."270 Second, the state must have a "strong basis in evidence"
to conclude that remedial action is necessary before it employs a
race-conscious remedy."71 The amelioration of alleged vote dilu-
tion as a consequence of alleged racial bloc voting does not jus-
tify race-conscious districting unless the state employs sound
districting principles and the minority group is sufficiently geo-
graphically compact to create a majority-minority district." The
Court has noted that only three Justices in UnitedJewish Organiza-
tions v. Carey were prepared to say that states have a compelling
governmental interest in ameliorating the consequences of racial
bloc voting outside the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.2 3
C. Conclusion
Unlike the Court's older vote dilution jurisprudence, which
relied upon a rebuttable presumption device to create a pre-
sumption of racial discrimination from purported evidence of
racially disproportional results and to shift the burden of produc-
tion to the defendant, the Court's new racial gerrymandering
jurisprudence uses a permissive inference device. The plaintiff
must prove racially discriminatory purpose, not racially dispro-
portionate results, and the burden of production and persuasion
shifts to the defendant only after the plaintiff has established
racially discriminatory purpose.
The injury in a racial gerrymandering claim is not vote dilu-
tion, but the use of a racial classification in violation of the Equal
268. The shape of a district is relevant not only as circumstantial evidence
of improper purpose, but as evidence of respect for traditional districting
principles. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961.
269. Shaw A 116 S. Ct. at 1902; Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962.
270. Id. at 1903 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 498 (1989)).
271. Shawf1, 116 S. Ct. at 1903; Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
272. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993); Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1963.
273. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
1997] RACE DPSA
294 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol 11
Protection Clause. The injury is caused by the assignment of vot-
ers to voting districts on the basis of racial criteria. The remedy
is the reassignment of voters to voting districts on the basis of
non-racial criteria. The evidence which may be used to establish
racially discriminatory purpose is direct evidence of legislative
purpose and circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and
demographic characteristics.
VI. CONCLUSION
The larger question, which has received the most focus from
commentators, is whether race-conscious remedies may be used
to ameliorate race-conscious injuries without violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Justices
Thomas and Scalia have indicated that race-conscious remedies
always violate the Equal Protection Clause. Justice O'Connor,
frequently joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ken-
nedy, have endorsed the idea that race-conscious remedies may
be used if they are truly narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. Her framework for the use of race-con-
scious districting, outlined in a separate concurring opinion to
her plurality opinion in Bush v. Vera, provides an indication of
her thinking:
First, so long as they do not subordinate traditional
districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake or as a
proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority dis-
tricts, and may otherwise take race into consideration,
without coming under strict scrutiny .... Only if tradi-
tional districting criteria are neglected and that neglect is
predominantly due to the misuse of race does strict scru-
tiny apply.
Second, where voting is racially polarized, § 2 prohib-
its States from adopting districting schemes that would
have the effect that minority voters "have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to.. .elect represent-
atives of their choice." . . . That principle may require a
State to create a majority-minority district where the three
Gingles factors are present ....
Third, the state interest in avoiding liability under
VRA § 2 is compelling.... If a State has a strong basis in
evidence for concluding that the Gingles factors are pres-
274. See, e.g., Edward J. Erler, The Future of Civil Rights: Affirmative Action
Redivivus, 11 NoTm DAlm J.L. ET-ics & PUB. POL'Y 15 (1997).
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ent, it may create a majority-minority district without await-
ing judicial findings ....
Fourth, if a State pursues that compelling interest by
creating a district that "substantially addresses" the poten-
tial liability, ... and does not deviate substantially from a
hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly
racial reasons .... its districting plan will be deemed nar-
rowly tailored ....
Finally, ... districts that are bizarrely shaped and non-
compact, and that otherwise neglect traditional districting
principles and deviate substantially from the hypothetical
court-drawn district, for predominantly racial reasons, are
unconstitutional.275
This framework for preserving a narrowly tailored use for race-
conscious districting gives effect to Justice O'Connor's statement
in Adarand Constmaors, Inc. v. Pena that she wanted to "dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' "
276
However, the proponents of a broader use of race-conscious
remedies lack only one vote to constitute a majority. It is there-
fore important for the public debate that we clarify the grounds
upon which we conclude that racial discrimination persists. The
framework developed in Shaw, whereby a plaintiff may use cir-
cumstantial evidence to raise an inference of racially discrimina-
tory purpose, represents the appropriate balance between relying
upon racially disproportionate results to presume racial discrimi-
nation (which may impose a remedy upon a defendant who did
not cause the racial discrimination) and requiring direct evi-
dence of racially discriminatory purpose (which may leave the
victim of racial discrimination without a remedy). More impor-
tantly, the Shaw framework properly teaches citizens how race
should matter in a society "dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal."
275. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1969-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
276. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
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APPENDIX B
This map highlights the Fourth Congressional District of Louisiana, part of a
districting plan enacted by the Louisiana state legislature. This plan was used
for the 1992 election. The Fourth District was held to be a racially gerry-
mandered district by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisi-
ana in Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
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APPENDIX C
This map highlights the Sixth Congressional District of Louisiana, part of a dis-
tricting plan enacted by the Louisiana state legislature after the previous plan
was found unconstitutional. This plan was used for the 1994 election. The
Sixth District was held to be a racially gerrymandered district by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Louisiana in Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F.
Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996).
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APPENDIX D
This map illustrates the congressional districting plan devised by the U.S. Dis-trict Court for the Western District of Louisiana after it found the previous planunconstitutional in Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996). Thisplan was used for the 1996 election.
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APPENDIX E
This map highlights the Eleventh Congressional District of Georgia, part of a
districting plan enacted by the Georgia state legislature. This plan was used for
the 1992 and 1994 elections. The Eleventh District was held to be a radally
gerrymandered district by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia in Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affid 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995). The Second District was also held to be a racially gerrymandered
district by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in John-
son v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
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AppENDix F
Th districting Plan adopted by the u.S. 
Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District 
Of Georgia ohnsoln v. Miller 
92'2 F
Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ca. 1995) after 
it found the previ
This plan was used for the 1996 election-
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APPENDIX G
4
The figure at the top illustrates the Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of
Texas, part of a districting plan enacted by the Texas state legislature. This
district was used for the 1992 and 1994 elections. The Twenty-Ninth District
was held to be a racially gerrymandered district in Vera v. Richards, 861 F.
Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd sub norm. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
The figure at the bottom illustrates the same district after it was redrawn by the
district court in Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996). This district
was used for the 1996 election.
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APPENDIX H
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The figure at the top illustrates the Thirtieth Congressional District of Texas.
This district was used for the 1992 and 1994 elections. The figure at the bottom
illustrates the same district after it was redrawn by the district court in Vera v.
Bush. This district was used for the 1996 election.
19971
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APPENDIX I
The figure at the top illustrates the Eighteenth Congressional District of Texas.
This district was used for the 1992 and 1994 elections. The figure at the bottom
illustrates the same district after it was redrawn by the district court in Vera v.
Bush. This district was used for the 1996 election.
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APPENDIX j
This map highlights the Third Congressional District of Florida, part of a dis-
tricting plan adopted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District ofFlorida in De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992). This
plan was used for the 1992 and 1994 elections. The Third District was held tobe a racially gerrymandered district by the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Florida in Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996).
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APPENDIX K
This figure illustrates the Fourth Congressional District of Illinois, part of a dis-
tricting plan adopted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
This plan was used for the 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections. The Fourth District
was found constitutional by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in King v. State Bd. of Elections, 1996 WL 130439 (N.D. Ill.), but the
Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case
back for reconsideration, King v. State Bd. of Elections, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996).
